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INTRODUCTION
Freedom of expression is a fundamental right in any well-established
democracy.1 This right promotes the free flow of information, thoughts,
Copyright 2017, by TODD CLARK.
 Todd J. Clark is a Professor of Law at North Carolina Central University.
First, I would like to thank God for putting me in a position to write about and
shed light on issues that I find compelling. I would also like to thank my mother,
Dora L. Clark, my father, Sherwood Hill, and my aunt, Selena Comer for all of
their love and support. Additionally, I would like to thank my son, Jordan K.
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and ideas. Freedom of expression prohibits leaders from manipulating their
power, stifling progress, and eliminating the voice of change. Inherent in the
freedom of the right to express is the right to oppose.2 Expression that goes
against the status quo “serves a vital social function in offsetting or
ameliorating the normal process of bureaucratic decay.”3 It empowers the
citizens of a democratic nation with the means to promote and maintain justice
by challenging majority ideas about fairness, equality, and justice. Through
this exercise,
[a] nation's unity is created through blending individual differences
rather than imposing homogeneity from above; that the ability to
explore fullest range of ideas on a given issue was essential to any
learning process and truth cannot be arrived upon unless all points of
view are first considered; and that by considering free thought,
censorship acts to the detriment of material progress.4
This fundamental right to freedom of expression is threatened by the use
of morals clauses in celebrity endorsement deals. Morals clauses are
contractual provisions that provide corporations with an express, unfettered
right to terminate an athlete or celebrity spokesperson’s endorsement
contract when the endorser acts in a manner deemed socially reprehensible
Clark, for serving as part of my motivation for writing. Hopefully, my writings
and work as a professor will one day inspire him to achieve his greatest potential.
In addition, I would like to thank Professor andré douglas pond cummings,
Professor Reggie Mombrun, Professor Grace Wigal, and Professor Mary Wright
for all of the time they dedicated to helping me improve as both a scholar and a
law professor. Anything that I have managed to do well as a member of the
academy is largely a function of their dedication and vested interest in my success.
I am also grateful to Professor andré douglas pond cummings, Professor Kimberly
Cogdell Granger for reading drafts of my article. I also appreciate the scholarship
grant provided by North Carolina Central School of Law that supported the
production of this article. Finally, I am extremely grateful for the assistance
provided by my research assistant Alexis White who worked diligently to help me
organize my citations and to prepare this article for publication.
1. “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
2. RANDAL MARLIN, PROPAGANDA AND THE ETHICS OF PERSUASION 240–
41 (2002).
3. Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment,
72 YALE L.J. 877, 884 (1964).
4. See RHONA K. M. SMITH & CHRISTIEN VAN DEN ANKER, THE ESSENTIALS
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 127 (2005) (discussing one of the earliest defenses advanced
by John Milton, English Poet and political writer, in favor of freedom of speech
in his work, “Areopagitica”).
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by corporate leadership.5 Such provisions typically are included in
standard endorsement contracts and give the corporation wide latitude to
cancel the agreement upon an act by the celebrity spokesperson perceived
as detrimental to the corporation’s brand and image.6
Providing corporations with such broad discretion impairs social
progress because morals clauses can stifle thought-provoking and changeoriented speech. The very essence of the First Amendment is subjugated to
a meaningless idea of grandeur because modern-day corporations now have
an unbridled right to temper speech in the private context through the use
of broadly drafted morals clauses. This reality is inherently dangerous
because a corporation has the right to regulate or restrict speech based
upon its assessment of how society will view the endorser’s expression.
This idea fundamentally is flawed for several reasons. First, given that
corporations are driven primarily by profit maximization, it is unnatural to
assign to them moral authority. Second, because white Americans—
specifically, white American males—occupy the overwhelming majority
of corporate leadership, the initial determination about what conduct is
morally reprehensible will be made by a homogenous group of people who
often views the world from a uniform perspective. Third, if morality is
determined by calculating what the majority of the spending population
thinks,7 then such a determination will favor white Americans’
conceptions of morality because the majority of wealth in the United States

5. Fernando Pinguelo & Tim Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?
An Examination of Morals Clauses in Talent Contracts and What Talent Needs to
Know, 19 SETON HALL J. SPORTS 348, 351 (2009).
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Toni Lester, “Finding the ‘Public’ in ‘Public Disrepute” –
Would the Cultural Defense Make a Difference in Celebrity and Sports
Endorsement Contract Disputes? - The Case of Michael Vick and Adrian
Peterson, 6 PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. L.F. 21 (2016) (explaining that
conceptions of morality often are influenced by racial and cultural factors as
evidenced by an ESPN poll that reflected that 57% of black Americans believed
that the media is biased against black athletes while only seven percent of white
Americans held the same belief. The poll further reflected that black people
believe that “the media unfairly criticizes black athletes more than white athletes,
while the white fans suggest there is no difference in the media's handling of
various cases.”); see also Jennifer Agiesta, CNN poll: Americans split on anthem
protests, CNN (Sept. 30, 2017, 2:29 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/29/politics
/national-anthem-nfl-cnn-poll/index.html (highlighting a poll that found that 59%
of whites said that kneeling during the National Anthem is wrong, whereas 82% of
blacks said that it's the right thing to do) [https://perma.cc/9TQT-X65V].
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is concentrated in the hands of white Americans.8 Fourth, due to an
incomplete understanding of the truth and a natural desire for people to
maintain the status quo—even when it is wrong or unjust—determining
what is morally acceptable is often difficult and normally takes time.
Finally, broadly drafted morals clauses present a Hobson’s choice9 for
celebrity endorsers by placing the endorser in the unfair and unreasonable
position of sacrificing their freedom of expression, particularly concerning
social justice issues, for monetary gain.
American history is riddled with athletes and entertainers who have
expressed themselves in ways that were deemed morally wrong at the time
of expression; after the passage of time and social enlightenment,
however, the same expression was championed as morally acceptable.
Based on the discretion that corporations have to evaluate morality, they
can terminate endorsement contracts prematurely according to their own
biased perceptions of morality before this enlightenment process occurs.
Muhammed Ali exemplifies this truth.
In 1966, legendary boxer Muhammed Ali10 famously remarked, “I
ain’t got no quarrel with them Viet Cong. No Viet Cong ever called me
nigger,” after he refused to serve in the army during the Vietnam War by
claiming conscientious objector status.11 When the public pressed Ali
further about his refusal to serve, he eloquently remarked,
You want me to do what the white man says and go fight a war
against some people I don’t know nothing about-get some freedom
for some other people when my own people can’t get theirs? We’re
over there so that the people of South Vietnam can be free. But I’m
here in America and I’m being punished for upholding my beliefs.12

8. Matt Bruenig, The Top 10% of White Families Own Almost Everything,
DEMOS (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.demos.org/blog/9/5/14/top-10-white-families
-own-almost-everything [https://perma.cc/93HR-J8ZC].
9. A Hobson’s choice literally means “take it or leave it.” See Caroline
Epstein, Moral Clause: Past, Present & Future, 5 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT.
L. 73, 98–99, for a discussion on the harsh results of broadly drafted moral clauses.
10. Biography of Muhammad Ali, BIOGRAPHY, http://www.biography.com
/people/muhammad-ali-9181165 (last visited Aug. 19, 2017) (explaining that
Muhammad Ali, three-time World Heavyweight Champion and Olympic Gold
Medalist, was a famous 20th century sports figure and activist and is considered
the greatest athlete of the 20th century) [https://perma.cc/68EM-FJQM].
11. Muhammad Ali - in his own words, BBC SPORT (June 4, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/sport/boxing/16146367 [https://perma.cc/H35F-M7W8].
12. HOWARD L BINGHAM & MAX WALLACE, MUHAMMAD ALI’S GREATEST
FIGHT: CASSIUS CLAY VS. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 149 (2012).
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In response to his refusal to serve and his open criticism of the war,
Ali drew the ire of the American public who, at the time, found his actions
cowardly, anti-American, and unpatriotic.13 As a result of his refusal to
serve in the army, Ali was convicted and sentenced to five years in prison
for draft evasion.14 Additionally, his boxing license was suspended, and he
was stripped of his boxing title while his case was under appeal.15 Four
years after he first was convicted, the United States Supreme Court, in a
seven-to-two vote, overturned his conviction.16 When Ali expressed his
political discontent about the Vietnam War, there was an overwhelming
public backlash against his actions.17 In hindsight, however, Ali now is
regarded as a hero for independent free thought and as a world champion
of positive social activism.18
Social activism also was on display during the 1968 Olympics in
Mexico City, Mexico when Tommie Smith and John Carlos, winners of
the gold and bronze medals in the 200-meter dash, respectively, stood on
raised Olympic victory podiums with their heads bowed while each man
extended his arm toward the sky as a symbol of black power.19 The
imagery of the moment was deliberate and designed to bring attention to

13. Krishnadev Calamur, Muhammad Ali and Vietnam, ATLANTIC (June 4,
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/06/muhammad-ali-vietnam
/485717/ [https://perma.cc/AR87-PXR3].
14. Id. Although Ali was sentenced to five years imprisonment, he never
served a day in jail for draft evasion. Id.
15. Id.
16. Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698 (1971).
17. See Justin Block, Muhammad Ali Risked It All When He Opposed The
Vietnam War, HUFF. POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/muhammad-alirisked-it-all-when-he-opposed-the-vietnam-war_us_5751e545e4b0c3752dcda4ca
(last updated June 24, 2016) [https://perma.cc/FUM5-MUNV].
18. David Remnick, a Pulitzer Prize-winning writer who authored the Ali
biography King of the World, noted of the boxing champion’s stand against the
Vietnam War:
As he had before and would again, Ali had showed his gift for intuitive
action, for speed, and this time he was acting in a way that would
characterize the era itself, a resistance to authority, an insistence that
national loyalty was not automatic or absolute. His rebellion, which
started out as racial, now had widened in scope.
DAVID REMNICK, KING OF THE WORLD: ALI AND THE RISE OF AN AMERICAN
HERO 287 (1999).
19. TOMMIE SMITH & DAVID STEELE, SILENT GESTURE: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY
OF TOMMIE SMITH 173 (2007).
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the unfair treatment of black people in the United States.20 Immediately
after their display, the President21 of the International Olympic Committee
(“IOC”) suspended Smith and Carlos from the United States National team
and banned them from staying in the Olympic village for making a
political statement in violation of the spirit of the Olympic Games.22 At
the time of their display, the American sentiment regarding their actions
was overwhelmingly negative.23 Time magazine characterized their
conduct as a “public display of petulance that sparked one of the most
unpleasant controversies in Olympic history and turned the high drama of
the games into theater of the absurd.”24 Today, however, that negative
20. Tommie Smith and John Carlos’ Black Power salute at the 1968
Olympics was a political demonstration.
[Smith’s] raised right [black gloved fist] stood for black power in
America. Carlos’s [raised] left [black gloved fist] stood for the unity of
black America. Together they formed an arch of unity and power. The
scarf around [Smith’s] neck stood for black pride. The black socks with
no shoes stood for black poverty in racist America. The totality of our
effort was the regaining of black dignity.
Id.
21. Ironically, although Avery Brundage, President of the International
Olympic Committee (“IOC”) in 1936 and prominent Nazi sympathizer during
the 1936 Olympics, opined that Smith’s and Carlos’s actions were “a deliberate
and violent breach of the fundamental principles of the Olympic spirit,” he did
not express the same objection towards the Germans’ Nazi salutes during the 1936
Olympics in Berlin. Brundage reasoned that Nazi salutes were acceptable because
the salutes represented a national symbol of expression in a competition of nations
but the black power salute was a salute of individual protest. Shirley Povich,
Berlin, 1936: At the Olympics, Achievements of the Brave in a Year of Cowardice,
WASH. POST (July 6, 1996), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/sports/long
term/general/povich/launch/olympics.htm [https://perma.cc/73H8-K95Q]. In
light of Brundage’s reasoning, at the time, his opinion was grossly inconsistent
with the IOC Charter that consistently has provided that “the Olympic Games are
competitions between athletes in individual or team events and not between
countries.” Int’l. Olympic Comm., Olympic Charter, ch. 1, r. 6, ¶ 1 (2015).
22. Initially, the United States Olympic Committee refused to send Smith
and Carlos home; when the president of the IOC threatened to ban the entire
U.S. track team, however, Carlos and Smith were expelled. MURRY R. NELSON,
1 AMERICAN SPORTS: A HISTORY OF ICONS, IDOLS, AND IDEAS 132 (2013).
23. See Gary Younge, The Man Who Raised a Black Power Salute at the 1968
Olympic Games, GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/world
/2012/mar/30/black-power-salute-1968-olympics [https://perma.cc/WGZ5-S64J].
24. The Olympics: Black Complaint, TIME (Oct. 25, 1968), http://content.time
.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,900397,00.html (“‘Faster, Higher, Stronger’ is
the motto of the Olympic Games. ‘Angrier, nastier, uglier’ better describes the scene
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sentiment has changed. Smith and Carlos now are regarded as heroes who
were central figures in the struggle for civil rights.25
Much like Ali, Smith and Carlos were hated by a majority of the
American public, and their actions were perceived as anti-American.26 It is
difficult to think that a corporation could have restricted their right to speak
on such important issues. Had Ali or Smith and Carlos been athletes today,
their exercise of freedom of expression could have cost them several
endorsement deals. Ali’s decision to defect served as a fundamental example
of how to stand up for one’s ideals. Smith and Carlos brought the evils of
racism in the United States to the social conscience of the world. Their actions
forced the United States to rethink its treatment of black people to avoid the
devaluation of its position as the primary dictator of morality. If the United
States could not treat its own people with dignity and respect, its ability to
encourage others to do the same would be undermined.
Today, modern athletes and entertainers are central figures in the fight for
justice. For example, both the National Basketball Association (“NBA”) and
the National Football League (“NFL”) have taken strong positions against the
discriminatory treatment of homosexuals.27 Many hip-hop artists and hip-hop

in Mexico City last week. There, in the same stadium from which 6,200 pigeons
swooped skyward to signify the opening of the ‘Peace Olympics,’ Sprinters
Tommie Smith and John Carlos, two disaffected black athletes from the U.S. put on
a public display of petulance that sparked one of the most unpleasant controversies
in Olympic history and turned the high drama of the games into theater of the
absurd.”) [https://perma.cc/B5BA-MDUB].
25. William C. Rhoden, Sports of The Times; Vilified to Glorified: Olympic
Redux, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/17/sports
/othersports/vilified-to-glorified-olympic-redux.html (“In 1968, Smith and Carlos
made one of the most courageous and enduring acts of sports demonstration in my
lifetime, possibly in modern athletic history, when they raised black-gloved fists
and bowed their heads on the victory stand at the Mexico City Olympic Games. The
act was a profound gesture against oppression. Today at San Jose State University,
their message will come full circle, 37 years later, with a daylong celebration that
will end with the unveiling of a 24-foot bronze statue commemorating their Mexico
City demonstration.”) [https://perma.cc/4QFW-DVH8].
26. Ben Cosgrove, Black Power Salute: Tommie Smith and John Carlos at the
1968 Olympics, TIME (Sept. 27, 2014), http://time.com/3880999/black-powersalute-tommie-smith-and-john-carlos-at-the-1968-olympics/ [https://perma.cc/Q6Z
M-XC3X].
27. Hannah Withiam, Amar’e Stoudemire Under Fire for Gay ‘Joke’ Days
After Tolerance Award, N.Y. P OST (Feb. 28, 2017), http://nypost.com/2017
/02/28/amare-stoudemire-under-fire-for-gay-joke-days-after-tolerance-award/
(discussing how the former NBA player for the New York Knicks “jokingly” made
homophobic comments in response to a reporter’s question about a hypothetical
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personalities, including Jay-Z,28 Kanye West,29 and Russel Simmons,30
actively participated in the Occupy Wall Street movement.31 The influence of
homosexual teammate) [https://perma.cc/C4PQ-GXK5]. This comment followed
days after receiving the Martin Luther King Jr. Award, “championing his efforts to
promote diversity and tolerance.” Earlier in 2012, the league fined Stoudemire
$50,000 for using a homophobic slur against a disgruntled fan who messaged the
player about his game performance. Id.
28. Shawn Corey Carter, also known as Jay-Z, is an award-winning hip-hop
recording artist and business man. Growing up in the drug-infested Macy Projects
of New York City, Jay-Z fell victim to the drug, gun violence, and gang culture.
At an early age, he turned to rap to escape the social ills plaguing his community.
In 1996, he joined Roc-a-Fella records and released his debut album, Reasonable
Doubt. Throughout the years, Jay-Z has released a slew of No. 1 albums and hit
singles. Over the years, he has expanded his brand, starting his own clothing line,
Roc-a-Wear, headed his own entertainment management business, Roc Nation,
and launched Tidal, a music streaming service. Biography of Jay Z, BIOGRAPHY,
http://www.biography.com/people/jay-z-507696 (last visited May 21, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/L427-L2BD].
29. Kanye West is a Grammy Award-winning rapper, record producer, and
fashion designer. Growing up in Chicago, Kanye was drawn to the South-side’s
hip-hop scene and began producing for local artists. After moving to New York
in 2001, he got his big break when he produced the track “This Can’t Be Life” for
Jay-Z. He transitioned from behind the scenes to a reputable hip-hop artist after
the release of his well-received debut album, College Dropout. Shortly after its
release, Kanye began his own record label, GOOD Music. His sophomore album,
Late Registration, debuted at No. 1 on the Billboard Hot 200—a feat West would
repeat with every subsequent solo album release. Biography of Kanye West,
BIOGRAPHY, http://www.biography.com/people/kanye-west-362922 (last visited
May 21, 2017) [https://perma.cc/X849-ZGLP].
30. Hip-hop mogul and co-founder of Def Jam Records, Russell Simmons
was the force behind the hip-hop revolution. He began his career by promoting
and managing hip hop artists such as LL Cool J, the Beastie Boys, Public Enemy,
Kurtis Blow, and Run DMC. Biography of Russell Simmons, BIOGRAPHY,
https://www.biography.com/people/russell-simmons-307186 (last visited Sept.
15, 2017) [https://perma.cc/WP85-MYRL].
31. Randy Roper, Russell Simmons, Jay-Z Planning Occupy Wall Street Concert,
HIP-HOP WIRED (Nov. 22, 2011, 11:57 AM), http://hiphopwired.com/2011/11
/22/russell-simmons-jay-z-planning-occupy-wall-street-concert/ [https://perma.cc/Y
LK7-QYQN]. The Occupy Wall Street Movement was a social movement for
economic justice. The movement largely was motivated by the concern that 99% of
the United States’s wealth is concentrated in the hands of the richest one percent of
Americans. See Heather Gautney, What is Occupy Wall Street? The history of
leaderless movements, WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 2011), https://www.washington
post.com/national/on-leadership/what-is-occupy-wall-street-the-history-of-leaderless
-movements/2011/10/10/gIQAwkFjaL_story.html?utm_term=.614d11c701e7
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athletes and entertainers is vitally important in bringing matters of public
concern to the attention of the masses. Often, the attention of these individuals
can effectuate legitimate and positive change.
Although a company clearly has a right to use morals clauses and a vested
interest in doing so to protect its brand image and goodwill, morals clauses
should not trammel political and thought-provoking expression unreasonably.
When an athlete enters into an endorsement contract, there is clearly an
agreement wherein the athlete has an obligation to promote the brand name
of the company; such agreements, however, should not be construed liberally
to allow an organization to treat the endorser as a pawn. This Article does not
suggest that two parties cannot contract to limit, restrict, or prohibit certain
types of speech. Rather, this Article argues that certain types of speech are so
germane in expanding moral foundation that such speech should not be
restricted unreasonably. This Article advocates for a burden-shifting
framework that fairly balances the interests of the athlete-endorser, the
corporation, and the public in deciding the enforceability of morals clauses
that attempt to censor thought-provoking or political speech. Under the
existing framework, once a corporation terminates an athlete-endorser’s
contract pursuant to the corporation’s unilateral determination that the athleteendorser’s conduct violates the contract’s morals clause, the athlete-endorser
bears the burden of establishing that the corporation’s termination amounts to
a breach of the contract. Conversely, pursuant to the approach advanced in
this Article, once a plaintiff successfully establishes that his speech is thoughtprovoking or political in nature,32 a presumption arises that his speech is
protected and his endorsement contract cannot be terminated for such speech.
The corporation can rebut this presumption by proving that the plaintiffendorser’s speech is in direct contravention to the purpose of the endorsement
contract; the plaintiff-endorser’s expression has a direct and negative effect
on the corporation’s goodwill or brand image; or the contract includes a clause
that is tailored narrowly to prohibit the specific speech expressed by the
plaintiff-endorser.33 If a corporation is unable to meet its burden, termination
of the endorsement contract by the corporation will result in a breach of the
implied obligation of good faith or violate public policy. This approach is
different from the existing framework because it more fairly allocates the
burden of proof by placing more of it on the corporation when the corporation
terminates an athlete-endorser for engaging in thought provoking or political
expression.

[https://perma.cc/U952-A857].
32. See discussion infra Part VI.
33. See discussion infra Part VI.
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Part I of this Article chronicles the development and creation of the
morals clause as a means to curb various types of expression. Part II provides
a comprehensive background and historical context of the development of the
implied obligation of good faith. Part III explains how public policy
considerations influence the enforceability of some contracts. Part IV
analyzes the Rashard Mendenhall case that brought the issue of discretionary
enforcement of morals clauses to light. Part V highlights the perils of
providing corporations with the power to exercise their own discretion in
unilaterally determining whether an athlete-endorser’s conduct is morally
reprehensible. Part VI provides a resolution to this problem and explains how
the solution presented in this Article strikes a fairer balance between the
interests of society, the endorser, and the corporation. Finally, Part VII
discusses the various types of speech that are protected by the First
Amendment and how, by analogy, First Amendment jurisprudence can be
used to determine what types of speech should be protected contractually.
I. MORALS CLAUSES
A morals clause is a contractual provision that allows one party the right
to terminate an agreement based on conduct the party deems morally
reprehensible.34 Morals clauses have existed for almost 100 years and first
began to appear in contracts in the early 1920s.35 Roscoe “Fatty” Arbuckle
was the impetus for the creation of what the law now recognizes as a morals
clause.36 Arbuckle was a silent film comedian and actor in the early 1920s
whose services were in high demand until he was arrested and charged with
the murder of actress Virginia Rappe.37 The facts surrounding the incident
largely were disputed. According to Arbuckle,
[W]hen he retired to his room to change clothes, he found Rappe
vomiting in his bathroom. He then helped clean her up and led her to
a nearby bed to rest. Thinking she was just overly intoxicated, he left
34. Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 5, at 351 (“[A] morals clause is a
contractual provision that gives one contracting party (usually a company) the
unilateral right to terminate the agreement, or take punitive action against the
other party (usually an individual whose endorsement or image is sought) in the
event that such other party engages in reprehensible behavior or conduct that may
negatively impact his or her public image and, by association, the public image of
the contracting company.”).
35. Id. at 353–54.
36. Id. at 354–55.
37. Jude Sheerin, ‘Fatty’ Arbuckle and Hollywood’s first scandal, BBC NEWS
(Sept. 4, 2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-14640719 [https://perma
.cc/7MFR-BUU3].
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her to rejoin the party. When he returned to the room just a few
minutes later, he found Rappe on the floor. After putting her back on
the bed, he left the room to get help.38
At least one witness contended that Arbuckle raped Ms. Rappe and then left
her in his room to die.39 The media followed Arbuckle’s trial very closely and
several of them reported that Arbuckle crushed Ms. Rappe with his body
weight during the alleged sexual encounter.40 Others reported, in graphic
detail, that he penetrated her with a foreign object.41 The case was tried three
times.42 The first two cases ended in hung juries.43 The jury deliberations of
the third trial only lasted a few minutes before the jury returned a not guilty
verdict.44 The jury also issued Arbuckle the following apology:
Acquittal is not enough for Roscoe Arbuckle. We feel that a great
injustice has been done him. We feel also that it was our only plain
duty to give him this exoneration. There was not the slightest proof
adduced to connect him in any way with the commission of a crime.
He was manly throughout the case and told a straightforward story
on the witness stand, which we all believed. The happening at the
hotel was an unfortunate affair for which Arbuckle, so the evidence
shows, was in no way responsible. We wish him success and hope
that the American people will take the judgment of fourteen men and
women who have sat listening for thirty-one days to the evidence that
Roscoe Arbuckle is entirely innocent and free from all blame.45
Despite the final disposition of the case, Arbuckle’s career was ruined as some
people refused to believe his innocence; as a result, the movie industry
blacklisted him.46 In response to this situation, many Hollywood studios
began inserting morals clauses in their contracts.47

38. See Jennifer Rosenberg, The “Fatty” Arbuckle Scandal, THOUGHTCO.,
https://www.thoughtco.com/fatty-arbuckle-scandal-1779625 (last visited Aug.
17, 2017) [https://perma.cc/5FWW-5MN8].
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 5, at 355.
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Around the same time of the Fatty Arbuckle disaster, Babe Ruth48 was
drawing the ire of the New York Yankees franchise for his night life activities49
and his frequent drinking. As a result of his opprobrious behavior, New York
Yankees owner Colonel Jake Ruppert required that Ruth sign one of the first
clauses attempting to curb an athlete’s erratic and irresponsible behavior in an
effort to protect the brand image of a franchise.50 The provision in Ruth’s
agreement provided, in relevant part, that he was to
refrain and abstain entirely from the use of intoxicating liquors and that
he shall not during the training and playing season in each year stay up
later than 1 o’clock A.M. on any day without the permission and
consent of the Club’s manager, and it is understood and agreed that if
at any time during the period of this contract, whether in the playing
season or not, the player shall indulge in intoxicating liquors or be
guilty of any action or misbehavior which may render him unfit to
perform the services to be performed by him hereunder, the Club may
cancel and terminate this contract and retain as the property of the Club,
any sums of money withheld from the player's salary as above
provided.51
This provision was not technically a morals clause because the Yankees did not
have an express right to terminate his contract for morally reprehensible
conduct.52 Instead, this provision merely allowed the Yankees to terminate
Ruth’s contract if he indulged in intoxicating liquors, criminal activity, or any

48. Baseball icon Babe Ruth set numerous records as a pitcher and slugging
outfielder. He was among the first five players inducted into the sport’s Hall of
Fame. Biography of Babe Ruth, BIOGRAPHY, https://www.biography.com/people
/babe-ruth-9468009 (last visited Sept. 11, 2017) [https://perma.cc/93NU-7A3Q].
49. Ruth has been described as a glutton, womanizer, spendthrift, heavy
drinker, and smoker. Ruth also regularly collected speeding tickets, broke team
curfews, and engaged in fist fights with umpires, fans, and teammates. See 10
Things You May Not Know About Babe Ruth, H ISTORY (July 11, 2014),
http://www.history.com/news/10-things-you-may-not-know-about-babe-ruth
[https://perma.cc/L3D4-EZFX]. Apparently recognizing the problems that Ruth’s
off-the-field behavior could cause for a baseball team in an age of increased media
coverage, the New York Yankees introduced a clause similar to a morals clause
into Ruth’s playing contract in 1922. See Fernando M. Pinguelo, Timothy D.
Cedrone & Porcher Taylor, The Reverse-Morals Clause: The Unique Way to Save
Talent’s Reputation and Money in a New Era of Corporate Crimes And Scandals,
28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 65, 75 (2010).
50. DAVID A. MARK, HIDDEN HISTORY OF MAYNARD 99 (2014).
51. Id.
52. See Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 5.
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other activity that rendered him unable to play baseball.53 In contrast, a morals
clause is broader because it provides an express right to terminate the contract
when the athlete does something that the corporation believes is morally
unacceptable.54
During the McCarthy Era55 of the 1940s and 1950s, morals clauses often
were used as a means to “censor political conduct and expression rather than
challenge immoral conduct.”56 Because of American fears about the spread of
communism, Congress created the House Committee on Un-American
Activities (“HUAC”) in 1938 “to investigate alleged disloyalty and subversive
activities on the part of private citizens, public employees, and those
organizations suspected of having communist ties.”57 Committee members of
HUAC were interested particularly in the Hollywood film industry because it
was perceived as an incubator for possible communist activity.58 This
perception was based on two assumptions.59 First, as a result of the Great
Depression and the economic difficulties it created, HUAC members opined
that struggling actors and studio workers would be more vulnerable to bribes
from the Communist Party.60 Second, HUAC members believed that the movie
industry would be attractive to communist supporters as a “source of subversive
propaganda.”61 As a result, in 1947, HUAC unleashed a massive attack on the
movie industry by serving subpoenas on more than 40 individuals in the
industry, requiring that they appear before the committee for investigative
purposes.62 Out of this number, ten refused to cooperate with HUAC and
53. Pinguelo, Cedrone & Taylor, supra note 49, at 75–76.
54. See Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 5, at 357.
55. The McCarthy Era refers to a period in which companies would use morals
clauses to stifle political speech. The term “McCarthyism” was coined in reference
to the anti-communism practices of United States Senator Joseph McCarthy fueled
by tensions surrounding the Cold War. See RICHARD M. FRIED, NIGHTMARE IN RED:
THE MCCARTHY ERA IN PERSPECTIVE (1990). The phrase also refers to President
Truman’s Executive Order 9835 that “required that all federal civil service
employees be screened for ‘loyalty.’” Robert J. Goldstein, Prelude to McCarthyism:
The Making of a Blacklist, 38 PROLOGUE MAG. (2006), https://www.archives.gov
/publications/prologue/2006/fall/agloso.html [https://perma.cc/GA22-XV6F].
56. Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 5, at 355.
57. House Un-American Activities Committee, GEO. WASH. UNIV.,
http://www.gwu.edu/~erpapers/teachinger/glossary/huac.cfm (last visited Aug.
17, 2017) [https://perma.cc/VC9J-AEDM].
58. Hollywood Ten, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/holly
wood-ten (last visited May 21, 2017) [https://perma.cc/9S95-8EYX].
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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declined to answer whether they had an affiliation with the Communist Party,
claiming that they had a First Amendment right to associate with whomever they
desired.63 These individuals became known as the Hollywood Ten.64 Because of
their refusal to cooperate, they were cited by the House of Representatives for
contempt of Congress.65 As a result, many of the Hollywood Ten were blacklisted
by Hollywood studios.66 Additionally, many of the studios invoked the morals
clauses contained in these individuals’ contracts to terminate their employment.67
Based on these terminations, three of the Hollywood Ten brought lawsuits against
the studios for breach of contract.68
In the first case of the trilogy, Loew’s Inc. v. Cole, Lester Cole was terminated
pursuant to the morals clause contained in his employment agreement after he
refused to answer adequately whether he was a communist before HUAC.69 The

63. Id.
64. Id. (“The 10 individuals who defied HUAC were Alvah Bessie (c. 190485), Herbert Biberman (1900-71), Lester Cole (c. 1904-85), Edward Dmytryk
(1908-99), Ring Lardner Jr. (1915-2000), John Howard Lawson (1894-1977),
Albert Maltz (1908-1985), Samuel Ornitz (1890-1957), Robert Adrian Scott
(1912-73) and Dalton Trumbo (1905-76).”).
65. ROBERT H. STANLEY, THE CELLULOID EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN MOVIE INDUSTRY 130–31 (1978).
66. Arthur Eckstein, The Hollywood Ten in history and memory, 16 FILM
HISTORY: AN INT’L J. 424, 427 (2004). The blacklisting occurred both officially and
unofficially. Officially, it occurred through a “joint public announcement of the
motion picture firms in November 1947 that henceforth no studio would knowingly
employ any member of the Communist Party, or the members of any other group
which advocated the overthrow of the United States government by revolution.” Id.
at 424. Unofficially, it occurred through media publications that openly identified
individuals having alleged communist ties and through an elimination of job
opportunities for such individuals. Id.
67. See Loew’s, Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641, 649 (9th Cir. 1950); Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Lardner, 216 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1954); Scott v. RKO
Radio Pictures, Inc., 240 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1957).
68. See Loew’s, 185 F.2d 641; Lardner, 216 F.2d 844; Scott, 240 F.2d 87.
69. Loew’s, 185 F.2d at 645. The morals clause provided:
The employee agrees to conduct himself with due regard to public
conventions and morals, and agrees that he will not do or commit any
act or thing that will tend to degrade him in society or bring him into
public hatred, contempt, scorn or ridicule, or that will tend to shock,
insult or offend the community or ridicule public morals or decency,
or prejudice the producer or the motion picture, theatrical or radio
industry in general.
Id.
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jury resolved a form of special verdict,70 containing four questions, in Cole’s
favor.71 The trial court affirmed the jury’s determination that Loew’s, Inc.
(“Loew’s”) breached Cole’s employment contract.72 The court of appeals
reversed the trial court’s decision and disagreed with all of the trial court’s
holdings.73 In regards to the trial court’s first holding, the court of appeals held
that Cole’s refusal to answer gave the public the general perception that he
was a member of the Communist Party.74 Because such association, in 1947,
largely was considered un-American and morally reprehensible, there were
sufficient facts to establish that Cole engaged in conduct that contravened his
employment agreement.75 In regards to the trial court’s second holding, the
70. A special verdict form limits the discretion of the jury in deciding a case
only to those questions identified on the form. After deliberating, the jury provides
responses to specific questions of fact. Thereafter, the court applies the jury’s
factual determinations to the relevant law to determine the prevailing party. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 49(a).
71. Loew’s, 185 F.2d at 646. The special verdict form contained the following
four questions:
Question 1: Did the plaintiff Lester Cole by his statements and conduct
before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, in connection
with the hearing held by said Committee, bring himself or tend to bring
himself into public hatred, contempt, scorn, or ridicule? (Answer ‘yes’
or ‘no’.) Answer: No.
Question 2: Did the plaintiff Lester Cole, by his statements and conduct
before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, in connection
with the hearing held by said Committee, tend to shock, insult or offend
the community? (Answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’.) Answer: No.
Question 3: Did the plaintiff Lester Cole, by his statements and conducts
before the House Committee on Un-American Activities in connection
with the hearing held by said Committee, prejudice the defendant Loew’s
Incorporated as his employer or the motion picture industry generally?
(Answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’.) Answer: No.
Question 4: Did the defendant Loew’s Incorporated by its conduct
towards the plaintiff, subsequent to the hearing, waive the right to
take action against him by suspending him? (Answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’.)
Answer: Yes.
Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 644.
74. Id. at 649.
75. Id. The court also opined that Cole’s intentional failure to answer HUAC’s
questions about his communist involvement might be considered a breach of the
morals clause because such refusal would be considered a misdemeanor. The court
noted that the morals clause provided that Cole “shall act ‘with due regard to public
conventions.’” Such provision “required more than a mere requirement of obedience
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court of appeals disagreed and held that the employer’s conduct of expressing
a disdain for HUAC’s investigative processes and procedures did not amount
to an approval of Cole’s decision to abstain from answering questions
regarding his communist ties.76 More specifically, the court held that
[t]he conduct of the employer during this period adds up to an attitude
of definite hostility and unfriendliness to the Committee hearings,
which the producers apparently feared was headed in the direction of
censorship of the screen. Thus Cole may have felt that he was
justified in carrying a torch for freedom of speech, and in protesting
against the proceedings. But we cannot think that as a matter of law
this gave him the implied consent of the employer to go so far as to
subject himself to a misdemeanor charge.77
According to the court of appeals, the trial court erred on this issue because it
focused solely on the fact that Loew’s made “no effort to warn or advise Cole
as to how he should conduct himself.”78 The employer, however, had no such
duty because
it might well have subjected itself to criticism by the Committee had
it undertaken to do so. Had it been disclosed at the hearing that Cole
had received instructions as to how to testify, Loew's might well
expect to be charged with an improper effort to exert its power as an
employer to induce the witness to slant his testimony.79
Regarding the trial court’s third and final holding, the court of appeals again
reversed, holding that Loew’s did not waive its right to terminate the contract
by continuing to employ Cole after his testimony before HUAC.80 Although
Loew’s was aware of Cole’s failure to answer at the HUAC hearing, the court
concluded that Loew’s did not have a full appreciation for the effect that
Cole’s conduct would have on its reputation and goodwill.81 As such, Loew’s
acquiescence to Cole’s continued employment was not a waiver of the morals
clause.82 Moreover, even if Loew’s in fact was aware of the effect that Cole’s

to [the] law . . . it necessarily include[d] an agreement to refrain from the commission
of a misdemeanor of this character.” Id.
76. Id. at 649–50.
77. Id. at 653.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 655–56.
81. Id. at 656.
82. Id.
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conduct would have on its reputation and goodwill, Loew’s still maintained a
reasonable time upon which to effectuate the termination.83
The second and third cases of the Hollywood Ten trilogy, Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Lardner84 and Scott v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.,85
ruled in favor of the studios by relying on the Cole precedent that
the natural result of the artist's refusal to answer the committee's
questions was that the public would believe he was a Communist,
and because a large segment of the public thought Communism was
evil, the artist violated the express morals clause by failing to comport
with public conventions and morals.86
The facts of the second case in the trilogy, Lardner, were substantially
similar to those of Cole.87 Much like Cole, Ring Lardner was a member of the
Hollywood Ten who was terminated by his employer, Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corporation (“Fox”), pursuant to the morals clause contained in his
employment contract88 after he failed to answer adequately whether he was a
Communist before HUAC.89 Lardner argued that he did not breach the
contract but contended that if his conduct did amount to a breach, his breach
was excused because Fox waived its right to discharge him by continuing to
employ him for almost a month after his failure to testify and assigning him
83. Id.
84. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Lardner, 216 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1954).
85. Scott v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 240 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1957).
86. Noah B. Kressler, Using the Morals Clause in Talent Agreements: A
Historical, Legal and Practical Guide, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 235, 245 (2005).
87. Lardner, 216 F.2d at 847.
88. Id. at 848. The morals clause contained in Lardner’s employment agreement
was substantially similar to the morals clause contained in Cole’s contract; the morals
clause in Lardner’s agreement, however, was a bit more comprehensive. The clause
in Lardner’s agreement provided:
The artist shall perform the services herein contracted for in the manner that
shall be conducive to the best interests of the producer, and of the business
in which the producer is engaged, and if the artist shall conduct himself,
either while rendering such services to the producer, or in his private life in
such a manner as to commit an offense involving moral turpitude under
Federal, state or local laws or ordinances, or shall conduct himself in a
manner that shall offend against decency, morality or shall cause him to be
held in public ridicule, scorn or contempt, or that shall cause public scandal,
then, and upon the happening of any of the events herein described, the
producer may, at its option and upon one week’s notice to the artist,
terminate this contract and the employment thereby created.
Id.
89. Id.
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to a new project.90 Much like Cole, the trial court found in favor of Lardner,
holding that he did not breach the contract, but if he did breach, Fox waived
its right to terminate.91 On the issue of breach of contract, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that Lardner’s conduct clearly provided
no benefit to Fox and actually hurt Fox’s brand image because of society’s
negative perception of communism at the time.92 As for Lardner’s waiver
argument, the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s decision on that issue
as well and remanded the case to the trial court for a determination as to
whether Fox had waived its right to terminate Lardner.93
The facts of the third and final case in the Hollywood Ten trilogy, Scott
v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., were substantially similar to the facts of both
Cole and Lardner, with one distinction: the trial court ruled against Scott,
holding that RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. (“RKO”) was justified in terminating
Scott because his conduct harmed RKO’s brand image.94 In addition, there
was no evidence that RKO waived its right to enforce the termination
provision.95
Since the McCarthy Era and the Hollywood Ten Trilogy, the primary use
of morals clauses has shifted from being used to attack the political ideologies
of the athlete to curbing immoral conduct and protecting corporate brand
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 851.
93. Id. at 853. In instructing the trial court on remand, the court of appeals
indicated that it was to determine whether Fox made any affirmations or engaged in
any conduct that would lead Lardner reasonably to believe that Fox waived its right
to terminate. Id. In addition, the jury was required to ascertain when Fox was fully
knowledgeable about the extent to which Lardner’s conduct harmed the brand image
of Fox. Id. Once Fox was aware of the extent of the harm, it had a reasonable time
thereafter upon which to terminate Lardner’s contract. Id.
94. Scott v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 240 F.2d 87, 91 (9th Cir. 1957). The
morals clause in Scott’s contract provided that
[a]t all times commencing on the date hereof and continuing throughout
the production or distribution of the pictures, the producer will conduct
himself with due regard to the public conventions and morals and will not
do anything which will tend to degrade him in society or bring him into
public disrepute, contempt, scorn or ridicule, or that will tend to shock,
insult or offend the community or public morals or decency or prejudice
the corporation or the motion picture industry in general; and he will not
willfully do any act which will not wilfully [sic] his capacity fully to
comply with this agreement, or which will injure him physically or
mentally.
Id. at 87–88.
95. Id. at 91.
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image.96 A 1997 survey conducted by Sports Media Challenge, a Charlottebased sports communication and image management company, “estimated that
nearly half of all endorsement deals had morals clauses included.”97 As of 2003,
industry experts estimated that morals clauses were included in at least 75% of
all endorsement agreements.98 Currently, the collective bargaining agreements
of the NBA,99 NFL,100 NHL,101 and MLB102 all contain morals clauses in their
standard player contracts. The reach of the morals clause, however, is not
limited to the sports and entertainment industries. Morals clauses often are

96. Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 5, at 356.
97. Eric Fisher, Sosa Flap to Change Endorsement Deals, WASH. TIMES
(June 28, 2003), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2003/jun/8/20030608124400-6755r/ [https://perma.cc/87FZ-D6ZF].
98. Id.
99. NAT’L BASKETBALL ASS’N, UNIFORM PLAYER CONTRACT (2011),
http://blog.techprognosis.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/NBA_Constitution.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T4BP-9XDJ]. Pursuant to Section 16(a)(i) of this Agreement, a team
may terminate a player’s contract upon written notice if the player “at any time, fail[s],
refuse[s], or neglect[s] to conform his personal conduct to standards of good
citizenship, good moral character (defined here to mean not engaging in acts of moral
turpitude, whether or not such acts would constitute a crime).” Id. § 16(a)(i).
100. NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 256 app.
A (2011), https://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/collective-bargainingagreement-2011-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/4T7D-3LWL]. Pursuant to Section
11 of the NFL Player Contract found in Appendix A of the Agreement, if a player
“has engaged in personal conduct reasonably judged by Club to adversely affect
or reflect on Club, then Club may terminate this contract.” Id. § 11.
101. NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN
NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE AND NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYERS’
ASSOCIATION (2013), http://cdn.agilitycms.com/nhlpacom/PDF/NHL_NHLPA_20
13_CBA.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CMU-9RMY]. Pursuant to section 2(e) of the
Stand Player’s Contract found in Exhibit 1 of the Agreement, the player agrees
“to conduct himself on and off the rink according to the highest standards of
honesty, morality, fair play and sportsmanship, and to refrain from conduct
detrimental to the best interest of the Club, the League or professional hockey
generally.” Id. § 2(e).
102. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, BASIC AGREEMENT 337 app. A (2017),
http://www.mlbplayers.com/pdf9/5450407.pdf [https://perma.cc/UP4H-R759].
Pursuant to section 7(b)(1) of this agreement, a Club may terminate if the Player
shall at any time: “fail, refuse or neglect to conform his personal conduct to the
standards of good citizenship and good sportsmanship or to keep himself in firstclass physical condition or to obey the Club’s training rules.” Id. § 7(b)(1).
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included in contracts between corporations and high-ranking executive
officers.103
Although morals clauses traditionally have been used by the corporation
to terminate a contractual relationship with an endorser, according to some
scholars, there has been a recent proliferation of “reverse morals clauses.”104
Reverse morals clauses operate much the same way as traditional morals
clauses except that they are used by the endorser as a shield to protect the
endorser from immoral conduct by the corporation.105 Pat Boone106 negotiated
the first contract containing a reverse morals clause.107 After Boone’s first
entertainment contract with Dot records108 was set to expire, Boone became a
born-again Christian and was worried about resigning with Dot because of
concerns about its strategy for marketing some of its other artists.109 As a
result, prior to resigning,
Boone considered reneging, upset over cover art for the [Bill Cosby]
label’s other new release: nude pictures of John Lennon and Yoko
103. Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 5, at 364 (finding that a significant
number of executive contracts contain provisions that allow a corporation to
terminate the agreement for acts of moral turpitude (referencing Stewart J.
Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment
Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231,
233, 248–49 (2006))).
104. See Pinguelo, Cedrone & Taylor, supra note 49, at 66.
105. Id. at 66–67 (“[A] reverse morals clause is a reciprocal contractual
warranty to a traditional morals clause intended to protect the reputation of talent
from the negative, unethical, immoral, and/or criminal behavior of the endorseecompany or purchaser of talent’s endorsement. Such a clause gives talent the
reciprocal right to terminate an endorsement contract based on such defined
negative conduct.”).
106. Charles Eugene “Pat” Boone was a successful pop singer with a wholesome,
squeaky-clean image in the United States during the 1950s and early 1960s. He was
a music chart rival of Elvis Presley and sold more than 45 million records, had 38 top40 hits, 54 chart appearances, and appeared in more than 12 Hollywood films. Jason
Ankeny, Pat Boone, Biography, ALLMUSIC, http://www.allmusic.com/artist/patboone-mn0000131681/biography (last visited Sept. 11, 2017) [https://perma.cc/26U
X-8SUP].
107. Pinguelo, Cedrone & Taylor, supra note 49, at 79.
108. Dot records was a prominent pop label from the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s
that focused on gospel, doo-wop, country, and vocal pop music. Scott Borchetta,
Chris Stacey on the Relaunch of Dot Records, Big Machine’s Latest Imprint,
BILLBOARD (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/recordlabels/5944866/scott-borchetta-chris-stacey-on-the-relaunch-of-dot-records
[https://perma.cc/TH8Z-3LCR].
109. Pinguelo, Cedrone & Taylor, supra note 49, at 79.
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Ono on the Two Virgins album. After much prayer, Boone, ready to
opt out of the deal, met with label executives. They were sympathetic
to his religious concerns and agreed to a “reverse morals clause”—
Boone’s contract would lapse if the record company, not the
performer, did something unseemly. Finally, it was agreed that no
formal contract would be drawn up. This was fortunate for Boone, as
a few months later the label went bust following [Bill] Cosby’s
departure.110
Even though the contract never was formally entered, Boone’s ability to
negotiate such a favorable condition was predicated largely upon the
magnitude of his celebrity at the time.111
Although there are no reported cases to date that have interpreted the
validity or viability of a reverse morals clauses, the Enron scandal,112
according to many legal scholars, obviated the current need for endorsees to
require the inclusion of such clauses. During the early 2000s, Enron, a
Houston-based energy company specializing in the purchase and sale of
natural gas, was wildly successful and created a brand image synonymous
with success.113 As a result of its success, Enron was able to acquire a 30-year,
$100 million deal for the right to name the Houston Astros’ baseball park.114
The Astros were hoping that Enron would continue to operate as a profitable
business entity and a company of high moral character and integrity.115
Enron’s success, however, came crashing down after John Olson, an energy
industry financial analyst, learned that Enron engaged in illegal business
practices.116 As a result, Enron filed for bankruptcy and the Astros
110. Joseph Reiner, Pat Boone, ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.encyclopedia.com
/doc/1G2-3493100014.html (last updated Sept. 15, 2017) [https://perma.cc/5N4FKNN9].
111. Id.
112. Susan Lee, Enron’s Success Story, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 26, 2001), https://www
.wsj.com/articles/SB1009316351669886920 [https://perma.cc/HX67-J96U].
113. Id.
114. Edward Wong, Astros’ Ballpark No Longer Enron Field, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 28, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/28/sports/baseball-astros-ball
park-no-longer-enron-field.html [https://perma.cc/PXK8-K2GH].
115. Id.
116. One of the primary illegal practices that Enron engaged in was the use of
off balance sheet financing. The hidden liabilities allowed Enron to maintain the
appearance of a rapidly growing, but financially stable, company until near the
very end when bankruptcy was imminent. Enron’s financial arrangements were
complicated and sometimes entailed transferring overvalued assets to partnerships
that it had a controlling interest in but was not required to include on its own balance
sheet. The partnerships, with minimal equity capital from outside investors, raised
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organization sought a court order excusing it from complying with the naming
rights agreement.117 Given Enron’s tarnished image, the Astros no longer
wanted a reminder of Enron’s failures and questionable business practices
memorialized in its stadium.118 When the Astros filed the court order,
Enron actually had not yet breached its agreement to make payments on
the naming rights deal; a breach was imminent, however, given Enron’s
financial condition.119 Consequently, the Astros agreed to a buyout with
Enron for $2.1 million.120
To date, courts have used two mechanisms to evaluate the enforceability
of a morals clause: (1) the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing;
and (2) the public policy exception. Specifically, when endorsers seek to
challenge a corporation’s discretion to terminate an endorsement deal, these
doctrines are the primary mechanisms that are used to establish that the
termination amounts to a breach of contract. Although both of these are
viable options, they do not offer sufficient protection in their current
iterations. Therefore, the following section provides a background for each
mechanism and explains how the approach advocated by this Article more
fairly balances the concerns highlighted herein.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMPLIED
OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH
Good faith is hardly a novel notion in American legal jurisprudence—
its conceptual roots can be traced back to Roman times.121 Despite good
faith being a well-established concept in American common law

most of their capital from loans using Enron stock, transferred assets, or pledges from
Enron as collateral. See Bill Keller, Enron for Dummies, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/26/opinion/enron-for-dummies.html [https://perma
.cc/FCJ3-R778].
117. Wong, supra note 114.
118. See Astros Buy Back Rights to Enron Field Name, BUS. J. (Feb. 27, 2002),
http://www.bizjournals.com/houston/stories/2002/02/25/daily20.html [https://perma
.cc/B47E-5KRR].
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. B. J. Reitier, Good Faith in Contract, 17 VAL. U. L. REV. 705, 708 (1983)
(citing Raphael Powell, Good Faith in Contracts, 9 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 16
(1956); ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT ON SALE OF GOODS 163
(1979); Michael J. Trebilcock, Good Faith in Sales Transactions, Research Paper
No. II.3, 4–5 (Ontario Law Reform Comm’n Sale of Goods Project 1974)).

2017]

AN INHERENT CONTRADICTION

23

jurisprudence,122 the notion of the implied obligation of good faith did not
develop until the second half of the 19th Century.123 Good faith is a
judicially-created concept that is deemed to be implied in every contract.124
It is important to note that the concept of “implying” terms was also a critical
development of the second half of the 19th Century.125
One of the first cases to imply a term into a contract that had yet to be
negotiated by the parties was Wood v. Lucy.126 Although the court did not
address specifically the issue of the implied obligation of good faith, the
court’s holding in Wood evinces an example of the shift from Formalism
to Realism. The Formalistic view, practiced during the first half of the 19th
Century, applied abstract contract rules to resolve contractual disputes
without considering factors outside of the agreement.127 Conversely,
pursuant to the Realist view, courts were willing to substitute an agreement
with terms not included by the parties while also considering factors
beyond the four corners of the document.128 In Wood, Lucy entered into
an endorsement deal with Wood wherein Lucy agreed to give Wood the
exclusive right to market, license, and endorse all of her products.129 In
exchange, Wood and Lucy were to split all of the profits from Wood’s
efforts evenly.130 In light of these obligations, the actual agreement did not
contain express language providing that Wood actually had to sell, market,
license, or endorse.131 After entering into the agreement, Wood learned
that Lucy had entered into an agreement with a large retailer wherein Lucy
agreed to market and endorse a line of clothing for the masses.132 This
agreement was in direct contravention of Lucy’s agreement with Wood.133

122. “Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair
dealing in its performance and its enforcement.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
123. Harold Dubroff, The Implied Covenant of Good Faith in Contract
Interpretation and Gap-Filling: Reviling a Revered Relic, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
559, 564 (2012).
124. Reitier, supra note 121, at 707–08.
125. Dubroff, supra note 123, at 559; see also id. at 559 n.1, for late 19th
Century common law contracts cases in which the implied covenant of good faith
was applied.
126. Wood v. Lucy, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917).
127. Dubroff, supra note 123, at 567–68.
128. Id. at 571–72.
129. Wood, 118 N.E. at 214.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See id.
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Wood brought suit against Lucy for breach.134 Lucy argued that the
agreement lacked consideration and therefore was unenforceable because
Wood had no obligation to do anything as the contract did not require
specifically that he market, license, or endorse her products.135 Judge
Cardozo ruled in favor of Wood, reasoning that there was consideration to
support the contract.136 Cardozo reasoned that, in an exclusive endorsement
contract, to give such contracts business efficacy, courts should imply an
obligation to use reasonable efforts.137
Approximately 16 years after Wood, the New York Court of Appeals
decided Kirke la Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co.,138 which is recognized
as one of the earliest cases dealing with the implied obligation of good
faith.139 In Kirke la Shelle, Kirke La Shelle (“Kirke”) entered into an
agreement with Paul Armstrong (“Armstrong”) wherein Armstrong granted
Kirke an exclusive right to perform and produce one of Armstrong’s
plays.140 Kirke subsequently purchased the play from Armstrong and began
to produce it.141 Sometime thereafter, Kirke was sued by a third party for
copyright infringement.142 Armstrong had fraudulently sold the play to
Kirke.143 As a result, Kirke sued and obtained a judgment against
Armstrong for the amount Kirke spent in defending the infringement
litigation and the money Kirke paid to Armstrong for the purchase of the
play.144 Armstrong died shortly before the judgment was entered.145 Kirke
attempted to satisfy the judgment against Armstrong’s estate but later
learned that it was insolvent because Armstrong had transferred
“practically all his plays and property to the . . . Paul Armstrong Company
[(“PAC”)].”146 Kirke then brought suit against PAC and its attorney for
fraud.147 The suit was settled, and, as part of the written agreement, Kirke
was to receive one half of all the proceeds generated from rivals of the

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 215.
Id. at 214–15.
Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163 (N.Y. 1933).
Dubroff, supra note 123, at 565.
Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Armstrong, 173 A.D. 232, 233 (1916).
Id.
Id. at 234.
See id.
Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 164 (1933).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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play,148 including monies generated from productions “on the road”149 or
“in stock.”150 The agreement also prohibited PAC from entering into any
future agreements that would affect title to the dramatic rights without
Kirke’s prior approval.151 After reaching this settlement agreement, PAC
sold the “talkie rights”152 of the play to another entity and declined to split the
proceeds with Kirke.153 Kirke then brought suit alleging breach of contract.154
Both parties conceded that “talkies” were commercially unknown at the time
of the agreement and were not in contemplation of the parties.155 The trial
court ruled in favor of PAC, reasoning that Kirke could not recover proceeds
from the sale of the talkie rights because those rights were not in
contemplation of the parties at the time they entered into the agreement.156
The appellate court disagreed, reasoning that there was an implied
obligation on behalf of PAC not to “render valueless the right conferred by
the contract.”157 The Kirke decision evidenced a desire to avoid the harsh
consequences of the Formalist/Classical approach.
The Formalist/Classical approach to the implied obligation of good faith
focused primarily on the plain meaning or the four corners approach to
148. Id. “Alias Jimmy Valentine” is a dramatization by the late Paul Armstrong,
playwright, of the novel, A Retrieved Reformation, by the late O. Henry. PAUL
ARMSTRONG, ALIAS JIMMY VALENTINE (1910).
149. Kirke was to receive one half of the monies generated by play companies
that produced the play outside of New York. Kirke La Shelle, 188 N.E. at 164.
150. Kirk also would be entitled to monetary benefit from stock companies
who performed the play regularly. Id.
151. Id. at 163.
152. A “talkie” was an early form of cinema; a movie synchronized with
speech and sound. See Dave Kehr, When Hollywood Learned to Talk, Sing and
Dance, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/17/movies
/homevideo/17kehr.html [https://perma.cc/PA3N-9DMZ].
153. Kirke La Shelle Co., 188 N.E. at 163.
154. Id. at 164.
155. Id. at 165
156. Id. The trial court determined that the contract between the parties did not
contemplate the production of the play in “talkies” because they were unknown
at the time. Id.
157. Id. at 168. The court also was highly persuaded by the fact that PAC
“breached the express covenant of the contract to refrain from making any
agreement affecting the rights conveyed to Kirk without its approval.” Id. In light
of this additional fact, it is unlikely that its absence would have affected the court’s
holding given the court’s reference to Frohman v. Fitch, 149 N.Y.S. 633 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1914). As the court in Kirke La Shelle noted, Frohman was squarely on point
with the case at bar but for the fact that the plaintiff in Frohman owed all the stages
rights and that it dealt with silent motion pictures, not “talkies.” Id. at 167.
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resolving contractual disputes whereby courts were limited in their
resolution of contractual disputes to the documents embodying the contract.
At the core of this view was the notion that the language of the parties’
contract should control and that, when interpreting and resolving contractual
disputes, courts should focus on the perspective of the objectively
reasonable person to best ensure fairness and, most importantly, consistency
in results. The promulgation of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”)
was a critical step in the development of the concept of the implied
obligation of good faith. Prior to its enactment, most jurisdictions
approached contract law from the perspective of the Restatement First of
Contracts and focused primarily on the expressed intent of the parties
without regard to any implied terms.158 The UCC’s provision, however, that
“[e]very contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith
in its performance or enforcement”159 entrenched the implied obligation of
good faith in contract law. This transition from looking only to the expressed
intent of the parties to implying good faith into every contract occurred as a
result of two developments: “one, language, because of its inherent ambiguity,
cannot always express perfectly the actual agreement of the parties, and two,
foreseeing all eventualities that may arise in contract performance is beyond
the capacity of humans and gaps in contract provisions inevitably will
arise.”160 As courts shifted from the Formalistic view of contract law to a
Realist view, as codified in the Restatement Second of Contracts161 and the
UCC, courts assumed increased levels of power to resolve contract disputes
while considering “the context of an agreement—usage, course of dealing,
course of performance, and other factors present in the relationship that gave
rise to the agreement.”162
As jurisprudence regarding the implied obligation proliferated, defining
its application became difficult. As a result, scholars like Professor Robert
Summers, co-author of the UCC, conceptualized that the implied obligation
of good faith should be viewed as an “excluder” without a specific general
meaning.163 Summers found it particularly troublesome to define good faith
158. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 20 (AM. LAW INST. 1932).
159. U.C.C. § 1-304 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977).
160. Dubroff, supra note 123, at 562.
161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
provides that “[e]very contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and
fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.” Comment (a) to this section
defines good faith as “faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency
with the justified expectations of the other party.” Id. § 205 cmt a.
162. Dubroff, supra note 123, at 562.
163. Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith—It’s Recognition
and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 816 (1982).
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and, instead, focused his efforts on identifying examples of bad faith. In
doing so, he identified four broad categories of bad faith: (1) bad faith in
contract negotiation and formation; (2) bad faith in raising and resolving
contract disputes; (3) bad faith in taking remedial action; and (4) bad faith
in performance and enforcement.164
A. Bad Faith in Contract Negotiation and Formation
As Professor Summers noted, this category of bad faith arises in the
following six scenarios:
Negotiating without serious intent to contract, abusing the privilege
to break off negotiations, entering into a contract without having the
intent to perform, entering a deal recklessly disregarding
prospective inability to perform, failing to disclose known defects
in goods being sold, and taking undue advantage of superior
bargaining power to strike an unconscionable bargain.165
The subcategories identified in this section involve cases in which the
parties deal with bad faith resulting from the relationship between the parties
before the contract actually is formed. The typical example of this category
involves a situation where parties have an “agreement to agree”; the
agreement, however, never is consummated because of the failure of one of
the parties to engage fairly.166
164. Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the
Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968).
165. See id. at 220.
166. A recent example of this situation is Citigroup’s attempted acquisition of
Wachovia in 2008. Although the case ultimately was settled, the following facts
are indicative of the type of facts that implicate a breach of the implied obligation
of good faith in the negotiation and formation of a contract in which one party
does not intend seriously to enter an agreement. In summary, Citigroup and
Wachovia reached an agreement in principle wherein Citigroup would acquire
several of Wachovia’s businesses and assume some of Wachovia’s debt. Before
the parties finalized a formal agreement, Citigroup and Wachovia executed an
exclusivity agreement providing that Wachovia was contractually forbidden,
among other things, to: (1) “enter into or participate in any discussions or
negotiations with, furnish any information relating to Wachovia . . . [or] otherwise
cooperate in any way with, or knowingly assist, participate in, facilitate or
encourage any effort by, any third party that is seeking to make, or has made, an
Acquisition Proposal”; or (2) “enter into any agreement in principle, letter of
intent, term sheet, merger agreement, acquisition agreement, option agreement or
other similar instrument relating to an Acquisition Proposal.” Immediately
thereafter, Wachovia entered into negotiations with Wells Fargo and refused to
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B. Bad Faith in Raising and Resolving Contract Disputes
Bad faith in raising and resolving contract disputes generally deals with
issues involving one party’s unfair or unreasonable actions in working to
settle contractual disagreements or one party’s failure to work diligently to
fulfill its obligations under the contract. In this category, Summers identified
the following subcategories: (1) evasion of the spirit of the deal; (2) lack of
diligence and slacking off; (3) willful rendering of only substantial
performance; (4) abuse of power to specify terms; (5) abuse of power to
determine compliance; and (6) interference with or failure to cooperate in
the other party’s performance.167
C. Bad Faith in taking Remedial Action
This category of bad faith generally occurs in three contexts: a party (1)
attempts to conjure up a dispute; (2) adopts an overreaching or “weaseling”
negotiate with Citigroup. Wells Fargo ultimately reached an agreement to acquire
Wachovia for more than $15 billion. Citigroup brought suit against Wachovia for
failure to negotiate in good faith pursuant to the exclusivity agreement. See
Complaint at 4, Citigroup, Inc. v. Wachovia Corp., 613 F. Supp. 2d 485 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (No. 08-Civ-8668).
167. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith, supra note 163, at 812.
Although this list is fairly exhaustive, Empire Gas Corp. v Am. Bakeries Co.
exemplifies the essence of the type of case highlighted by this category. In Empire
Gas, American Bakeries planned to purchase conversion units to convert its fleet
of vehicles from propane to gas. As a result, it entered into a four-year contract
with American Bakeries in which Empire Gas agreed to provide all the gas that
American Bakeries needed. After entering into the agreement, American Bakeries
decided not to convert its fleet from propane to gas and failed to purchase any gas.
As a result, Empire Gas brought suit, alleging that American Bakeries breached
the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing. The court of appeals affirmed
the decision of the trial court, ruling in Empire Gas’s favor. It reasoned that
Empire Gas had established successfully that American Bakeries continued to
own a fleet of approximately 3,000 trucks and possessed the financial capacity to
purchase the conversion units, yet failed to do so. More importantly, American
Bakeries failed to present any evidence justifying why it failed to purchase any of
its requirements. Instead, American Bakeries argued that it was not in breach of
the contract because it did not purchase the conversion equipment or the propane
from anyone else and therefore was free to reduce its requirements to zero. Again,
the court rejected this argument, opining that the implied obligation of good faith
requires that a buyer avoid an arbitrary decision to decline to perform its
requirements promise without some evidence to establish that such a decision is
reasonable in light of the circumstances. See Empire Gas Corp. v. Am. Bakeries
Co., 840 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1988).
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interpretation and/or construction regarding the language of the contract;168 or
(3) takes advantage of the other party in order to obtain a favorable
settlement.169 These types of cases occur after the parties have entered into a
contract but one of the parties acts in bad faith by attempting to get out of his
responsibilities identified in the contract or when a party leverages his position
to extract an unfair benefit.
D. Bad Faith in Performance and Enforcement
This category of bad faith typically occurs when a party acts unreasonably
in attempting to seek a particular remedy. Cases that fall into this category
involve situations in which a party abuses “the right to adequate assurances,
wrongful refusal to accept delivery, willful failure to mitigate damages and
abuse of power to terminate.”170
In reflecting on each of Professor Summers’s categories and subcategories,
it is clear that his conception of the implied obligation of good faith and fair
dealing is rooted in notions of morality.171
Good faith offers useful insight into the moral bases of contract, and
more specifically, into the sources and nature of contractual
obligation. Good faith can be seen as the primary basis of contract
liability. It entails that contract obligations are seen to arise because
we, as society, think that they should, and only so far as we think that
they should. Contracts can be seen to be binding in much the same
way as obligations of citizenship bind generally. The obligation to
perform contracts should, therefore, arise from a number of bases.172
Given that morality is a fundamental component of evaluating good faith in
contracting, it is imperative that courts use the concept of good faith as a
tool to prohibit unreasonable attempts to define morality in a homogenous
and under inclusive manner. Good faith must promote freedom of
expression, even when certain expression might be unpopular at the time it
is spoken—unpopular expression is the very expression that often moves
society towards a greater sense of understanding as well as a more just
perspective.
168. See Sylvan Crest Sand & Gravel v. United States, 150 F.2d 642, 644 (2d
Cir. 1945).
169. Lingenfelder v. Wainwright, 15 S.W. 844, 848 (1891). Summers, The
General Duty of Good Faith, supra note 163, at 812
170. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law, supra note 164, at 248.
171. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith, supra note 163, at 810.
172. Reitier, supra note 121, at 712 n.33.
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III. CONTRACTS IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
The other mechanism that courts may employ to limit the application
of an overly restrictive or unreasonable morals clause is the public policy
exception to enforcement of a contract. One of the primary arguments
against restricting a corporation’s right to determine the morality of an
endorser’s expression focuses on a fundamental tenet of contract law—the
idea of “freedom of contract.” Freedom of contract is a legal doctrine that
argues that the law should not operate to invalidate agreements freely
entered into by an endorser and a corporation, especially considering that
both of these parties likely are to be represented by counsel.173 Although
this is a compelling point, freedom of contract is constrained when the
contract violates public policy. The public policy defense to enforcement
of a contract has been applied in several contexts.174
First, the public policy defense can arise when a statute exists that
makes a contract unenforceable because the contract contravenes the
purpose of the statute. In these cases, whether the court will enforce a
contract that violates a statute often depends on whether the statute is
regulatory or revenue-raising.175 When a contract violates a revenueraising statute, courts are more willing to enforce the contract because the
primary purpose of the statute is to raise money, not to curb “bad”
behavior.176 When a contract violates a regulatory statute, courts likely will
not enforce such contracts because the purpose of the statute is to prohibit
conduct that is harmful to society, not primarily to raise money.177
Fitzsimons v. Eagle Brewing Co. provides a useful illustration of how courts
have declined to apply the idea of freedom of contract when the contract
violates public policy in the context of a regulatory statute.178 In Fitzsimons,
a defendant beer manufacturing company entered into a contract with a
plaintiff company that produced malt syrup, a key ingredient in the
production of beer.179 When the parties formed the contract, the plaintiff was
aware that the defendant did not possess a proper license to sell beer;
nonetheless, the plaintiff delivered the syrup, enabling the defendant to
173. See generally Jerome C. Knowlton, Comment, Freedom of Contract, 3
MICH. L. REV. 619 (1905).
174. See Walter Gellhorn, Contracts and Public Policy, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
679 (1935).
175. See, e.g., Christophersen & Kiaer, Inc. v. U. S. Navigation Co., 202
N.Y.S. 902, 903 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1923).
176. See id.
177. Fitzsimons v. Eagle Brewing Co., 107 F.2d 712, 713 (3d Cir. 1939).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 712.
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manufacture beer in violation of the statute.180 The plaintiff sued when the
defendant ultimately breached the contract and refused to pay for the
syrup.181 The district court ruled that the contract was unenforceable because
the parties were in pari delicto,182 and the court of appeals affirmed, refusing
to enforce the contract because it violated a public policy requiring liquorproducers to be licensed.183
Second, some courts are reluctant to enforce surrogacy agreements
when the agreement looks like it is nothing more than a transaction for the
sale of a child or when the agreement is not in the best interest of the
child.184
In addition to the aforementioned examples, there are other contexts
in which courts are unwilling to enforce contracts based on important
public policy concerns. Courts generally are reluctant to enforce contracts
in which a party agrees to an assignment of future wages185 or when a
contract includes a restrictive covenant that hinders a party from providing
professional services.186
These cases highlight the fact that the concept of “freedom to contract”
is not an unbridled right. Courts and legislatures are willing to restrain this
right when it trammels upon more compelling public interests, even when
contracting parties are sophisticated, specifically intend for a particular
result to occur at the time of contracting, or have consulted and/or retained
legal counsel during the contract negotiation process. In each of these
cases, the parties either had the assistance of counsel or contracted freely
and voluntarily, yet the court declined to enforce these contracts because
there was an overarching concern of protecting the public and ensuring
that two independent parties could not frustrate the needs of society.

180. Id. at 712–13.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 714. In pari delicto means equally at fault. In pari delicto,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
183. Fitzsimons, 107 F.2d at 714.
184. See, e.g., R.R. v. M.H. & Another, 689 N.E.2d 790 (1998) (holding that
the surrogacy agreement was unenforceable as a matter of public policy because
the agreement appeared as if it was drafted to provide for the sale of the child
instead of providing support to the mother for carrying the child to term).
185. LINDLEY DANIEL CLARK & STANLEY JAMES TRACY, LAWS RELATING TO
PAYMENT OF WAGES 31 (1926).
186. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983)
(prohibiting “a partnership, shareholders, operating, employment, or other similar
type of agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination
of the relationship”).
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Morals clauses that seek to limit free speech rights similarly frustrate this
purpose.
IV. THE RASHARD MENDENHALL CASE
The Rashard Mendenhall case served as the genesis for this Article.187
Hanesbrands terminated Mendenhall based on Hanesbrands’s contention
that he violated the morals clause in his endorsement contract after he
tweeted188 comments about the morality of celebrating Osama Bin Laden’s
death. In 2008, Mendenhall entered into a three-year contract with
Hanesbrands to endorse its products.189 Prior to the expiration of the original
contract, both parties contractually agreed to extend the endorsement
agreement for an additional four years but modified the agreement to include
the following clause:
If Mendenhall commits or is arrested for any crime or becomes
involved in any situation or occurrence (collectively, the “Act”)
tending to bring Mendenhall into public disrepute, contempt,
scandal, or ridicule, or tending to shock, insult or offend the
majority of the consuming public or any protected class or group
thereof, then we shall have the right to immediately terminate this
Agreement. HBI’s decision on all matters arising under this Section
17(a) shall be conclusive.190
Shortly after the contract extension, Mendenhall tweeted the following
comments after President Barack Obama announced the death of Osama
Bin Laden:
What kind of person celebrates death? It’s amazing how people can
HATE a man they never even heard speak. We’ve only heard one
side . . . 191
187. Mendenhall v. Hanesbrands, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 717 (M.D.N.C. 2012).
Rashard Mendenhall is a former NFL player. He played a total of six NFL seasons—
five for the Pittsburgh Steelers and one for the Arizona Cardinals. Player Profile for
Rashard Mendenhall, NFL, http://www.nfl.com/player/rashardmendenhall/939
/profile (last visited Sept. 11, 2017) [https://perma.cc/XJ7N-F93U].
188. Twitter is a social media platform that allows individuals to create and share
ideas and information instantly. About Twitter, TWITTER, https://about.twitter.com
/en_us/company.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2017) [https://perma.cc/H336-YXSH].
189. Mendenhall, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 719.
190. Id. at 720.
191. @R_Mendenhall, TWITTER (May 2, 2011, 2:29 PM), https://twitter.com
/r_mendenhall/status/65166153525379072 [https://perma.cc/J2VQ-EXRP].
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I believe in God. I believe we’re ALL his children. And I believe
HE is the ONE and ONLY judge.192
Those who judge others, will also be judged themselves.193
For those of you who said we want to see Bin Laden burn in hell
and piss on his ashes, I ask how would God feel about your heart?194
There is not an ignorant bone in my body. I just encourage you to
#think195
Mendenhall received both positive and negative responses to his tweets.196
As a result of the negative responses, he issued the following explanation:

192. @R_Mendenhall, TWITTER (May 2, 2011, 3:25 PM), https://twitter.com
/R_Mendenhall/status/65180241353646080 [https://perma.cc/39GG-2X83].
193. @R_Mendenhall, TWITTER (May 2, 2011, 3:26 PM), https://twitter.com
/R_Mendenhall/status/65180378125709312 [https://perma.cc/6U7T-593T].
194. @R_Mendenhall, TWITTER (May 2, 2011, 3:28 PM), https://twitter.com
/R_Mendenhall/status/65180868850884608 [https://perma.cc/ZU6C-6XV6].
195. @R_Mendenhall, TWITTER (May 2, 2011, 3:29 PM), https://twitter.com
/R_Mendenhall/status/65181197537513473 [https://perma.cc/8ABY-DGAF].
196. Complaint at 17–18, Rashard Mendenhall v. Hanesbrands, Inc., 856 F.
Supp. 2d 717 (M.D.N.C. 2012) (No. 11-Civ-570). According to Mendenhall’s
complaint, he received several positive responses to his views, including:
@R_Mendenhall At first I was upset about ur tweets but like ur goal it
got me thinkin mad respect for u man Love a man of God
@R_Mendenhall Forgiveness makes you a stronger and better person.
holding [grudges] and not learning about the person him/herself will
never get you anywhere
@R_Mendenhall That’s the purpose of life to manifest ideas & create a
better world for the future! #thinking leads to ideas, ideas = change!
@R_Mendenhall I wish people would stop disagreeing with you and
realize that by thinking, they are proving you right. You are so
refreshing.
@R_Mendenhall seriously says some of the most inspiring & truthful
things I’ve heard in a while, he changed my opinion on athletes. i would
give about anything just to have a conversation with @r_mendenhall. he
speaks some of the realest words i’ve ever heard.
@R_Mendenhall // appreciate your thought provoking tweets. it’s time
people stop living a selfishly blind life.
@R_Mendenhall you used to just be my favorite player on my favorite
team, now you are just one of my favorite people. #inspiration
@R_Mendenhall I’ve never been a Steelers fan, but I have more respect
for you than any other professional athlete I can think of.
@R_Mendenhall your mental state should be the prototype for not just
athletes but humans in general.
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I appreciate those of you who have decided to read this letter and
attain a greater understanding of my recent twitter posts. I see how
they have gotten misconstrued, and wanted to use this outlet as a
way to clear up all things that do not truthfully represent myself,
what I stand for personally, and any organization that I am a part
of. First, I want people to understand that I am not in support of
Bin Laden, or against the USA. I understand how devastating 9/11
was to this country and to the people whose families were
affected. Not just in the US, but families all over the world who
had relatives in the World Trade Centers. My heart goes out to the
troops who fight for our freedoms every day, not being certain if
they will have the opportunity to return home, and the families
who watch their loved ones bravely go off to war. Last year, I was
grateful enough to have the opportunity to travel overseas and
participate in a football camp put on for the children of US troops
stationed in Germany. It was a special experience. These events
have had a significant impact in my life.
What kind of person celebrates death? It’s amazing how people
can HATE a man they have never even heard speak. We’ve only
heard one side . . .
This controversial statement was something I said in response to
the amount of joy I saw in the event of a murder. I don’t believe
that this is an issue of politics or American pride; but one of
religion, morality, and human ethics. In the bible, Ezekiel 33:11
states, “Say to them, ‘As surely as I live, declares the Sovereign
LORD, I take no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but rather that
they turn from their ways and live. Turn! Turn from your evil
ways...” I wasn’t questioning Bin Laden’s evil acts. I believe that
he will have to face God for what he has done. I was reflecting on
our own hypocrisy. During 9/11 we watched in horror as parts of
the world celebrated death on our soil. Earlier this week, parts of
the world watched us in horror celebrating a man’s death.
Nothing I said was meant to stir up controversy. It was my way to
generate conversation. In looking at my timeline in its entirety,
everything that I’ve said is with the intent of expressing a wide array
of ideas and generating open and honest discussions, something I
believe we as American citizens should be able to do. Most opinions
will not be fully agreed upon and are not meant to be. However, I
Jack Greiner, Steeler’s Tweet Lawsuit Continues, GRAYDON LAW (Apr. 18, 2012),
https://graydon.law/steelers-tweet-lawsuit-continues/ [https://perma.cc/PG8S-6C
KY].

2017]

AN INHERENT CONTRADICTION

35

believe every opinion should be respected or at least given some
thought. I apologize for the timing as such a sensitive matter, but it
was not meant to do harm. I apologize to anyone I unintentionally
harmed with anything that I said, or any hurtful interpretation that
was made and put in my name. It was only meant to encourage
everyone reading it to think.197
Thereafter, Hanesbrands terminated Mendenhall’s endorsement contract
and issued this statement via ESPN:
Champion is a strong supporter of the government’s efforts to fight
terrorism and is very appreciative of the dedication and commitment
of the U.S. Armed Forces. Earlier this week, Rashard Mendenhall,
who endorses Champion products, expressed personal comments and
opinions regarding Osama bin Laden and the September 11 terrorist
attacks that were inconsistent with the values of the Champion brand
and with which we strongly disagreed. In light of these comments,
Champion was obligated to conduct a business assessment to
determine whether Mr. Mendenhall could continue to effectively
communicate on behalf of and represent Champion with consumers.
While we respect Mr. Mendenhall’s right to express sincere thoughts
regarding potentially controversial topics, we no longer believe that
Mr. Mendenhall can appropriately represent Champion and we have
notified Mr. Mendenhall that we are ending our business relationship.
Champion has appreciated its association with Mr. Mendenhall
during his early professional football career and found him to be a
dedicated and conscientious young athlete. We sincerely wish him all
the best.198
Mendenhall sued Hanesbrands for breach of the endorsement contract,
arguing that Hanesbrands’s termination (1) contravened the course of dealings
between the parties because Hanesbrands was aware of Mendenhall’s use of
Twitter to express his opinions on controversial subjects; (2) violated the
implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing; and (3) was unreasonable
because it was based on its mere disagreement with his comments and not
because Mendenhall’s comments brought him into “public disrepute,
contempt, scandal or ridicule, tending to shock, insult or offend the
majority of the consuming public or any protected class or group

197. Mendenhall v. Hanesbrands, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 717, 721 (M.D.N.C.
2012).
198. Id. at 721–22.
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thereof.”199 In response, Hanesbrands filed a Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings, arguing that the morals clause expressly granted Hanesbrands
the right to terminate the contract.200 Although the court agreed that
Hanesbrands possessed an express right to terminate the agreement, the
court held that the company could not exercise that right arbitrarily,
irrationally, or unreasonably. 201 Hanesbrands also attempted to argue that
Mendenhall’s admission in his complaint that he received negative
comments was sufficient to justify his termination because these statements
evidenced that his comments caused “public disrepute, contempt, scandal,
or ridicule, or tend[ed] to shock, insult or offend the majority of the
consuming public or any protected class or group thereof.”202 The court
determined that a dispute of material fact existed on this issue because
Mendenhall’s admission that he received negative comments was not an
admission that his comments caused widespread objection but only that
some people objected to his comments.203 In fact, Mendenhall’s complaint
also provided evidence that some people viewed his comments positively.204
Therefore, the court denied Hanesbrands’s motion because there was a dispute
of material fact regarding the nature of the public’s response to Mendenhall’s
comments.205
Although this case seems to offer some support to athletes when
challenging a corporation’s unilateral discretion to terminate an endorsement
contract based on a morals clause, the court failed to render a decision that
reflects the value of an athlete’s thought-provoking or political speech—
particularly when an athlete is a member of a marginalized population.
Although the court in Mendenhall dismissed Hanesbrands’s motion to
dismiss, Mendenhall nonetheless retained the burden of proof in establishing
that Hanesbrands violated the implied obligation of fair dealing in good

199. Id. at 725.
200. Id. at 726. In support of Hanesbrands’ Rule 12(c) motion, Hanesbrands
attached copies of several news reports that attempted to detail the public’s
negative perception of Mendenhall’s comments. The court did not allow the
reports into evidence because Rule 12(c) motions generally are based only on the
pleadings unless the accompanying documentary evidence is central to the
plaintiff’s claim and is not disputed. Because Mendenhall contested the
authenticity of the information contained in the reports, the court did not consider
the reports in denying the defendant’s motion. Id. at 726–27.
201. Id. at 726.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 727.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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faith.206 More accurately, the court did not determine that Hanesbrands
violated the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing, only that
Mendenhall pled sufficient facts to establish a dispute of material fact.207
Ultimately, both parties settled for an undisclosed amount.208 Although some
might view this case as a victory for athletes, such a conclusion is overly
optimistic; had the case not settled, both parties presumably would have
introduced evidence to establish the public’s opinion. In sifting through this
evidence, the judge would have processed it by evaluating it through his own
frame of reference. Although this approach seems reasonable, it has the
potential to be biased substantially in favor of white judges’ conceptions of
morality, which may not always coalesce with the moral conceptions of other
groups.209
V. DISCRETIONARY ENFORCEMENT
Toni Lester’s article entitled “Finding the 'Public' in 'Public
Disrepute” – Would the Cultural Defense Make a Difference in Celebrity
and Sports Endorsement Contract Disputes? - The Case of Michael Vick
and Adrian Peterson highlights a compelling issue about the discretion that
courts and corporations are afforded in the evaluation of whether an athlete’s
conduct is morally reprehensible.210 In his article, Lester evaluates the varying
and often conflicting perspectives and attitudes that black and white Americans
have regarding whether certain conduct is morally reprehensible.211 To
facilitate his comparison, Lester evaluated the social attitudes of black and
white Americans toward Michael Vick212 and Adrian Peterson213 after both
206. Id. at 724–25.
207. Id. at 727.
208. See Marc Edelman, Rashard Mendenhall Settles Lawsuit with
Hanesbrands over Morals Clause, FORBES (Jan. 17, 2013), https://www.forbes.com
/sites/marcedelman/2013/01/17/rashard-mendenhall-settles-lawsuit-with-hanes
brands-over-morals-clause/#7a909c052483 [https://perma.cc/US8E-UQVF].
209. See discussion infra Part V.C.
210. See Lester, supra note 7, at 21.
211. See id.
212. Michael Vick is a former American Football quarterback primarily for the
Atlanta Falcons and the Philadelphia Eagles of the NFL. In 2007, he was arrested
and convicted for his involvement in a dog fighting ring, spending 21 months in
federal prison. After his release, he signed with the Eagles in 2009 and briefly played
for the New York Jets and Pittsburgh Steelers until his retirement in early 2017.
Biography of Michael Vick, BIOGRAPHY, https://www.biography.com/people
/michael-vick-241100 (last visited Sept. 11, 2017) [https://perma.cc/FW7W-HXLJ].
213. Adrian Lewis Peterson is an American football running back for the New
Orleans Saints of the NFL. In 2014, Peterson was indicted on charges of reckless or
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were charged with engaging in criminal conduct.214 Vick was indicted and
ultimately plead guilty to crimes involving dog abuse but Peterson was
charged with child abuse and accepted a plea deal for a lesser charge of
reckless assault after he “spanked” his son with a tree switch resulting in
bruises to the boy’s body.215 In response to these criminal charges, Nike
terminated both athletes’ endorsement contracts based on morals clauses
contained in their agreements.216
Professor Lester’s article highlights the critical point that morality is not
absolute.217 Instead, conceptions of morality often are influenced by cultural
and racial contexts.218 As evidence of this reality, Lester referenced an ESPN
poll taken after Vick’s guilty plea that reflected that black people and white
people had different perspectives about the media’s portrayal of black
athletes.219 According to the results of the poll, 57% of black Americans
believed that the media is biased against black athletes while only seven
percent of white Americans held the same belief.220 In addition, the poll
reflected that black people believe that “the media unfairly criticizes black
negligent injury to a child and was suspended for most of the 2014 season as a result.
In April 2015, Peterson was reinstated to the league. Biography of Adrian Peterson,
BIOGRAPHY, https://www.biography.com/people/adrian-peterson-21155887 (last
visited Sept. 11, 2017) [https://perma.cc/WWP8-7TFK].
214. Lester, supra note 7, at 26–32.
215. Id. at 26, 29.
216. According to a Nike spokesperson, Nike terminated Vick’s contract after
Vick reached a plea deal. After publically terminating Vick’s agreement, Nike issued
a statement providing that “[w]e consider any cruelty to animals inhumane, abhorrent
and unacceptable.” Nike terminates contract with Michael Vick, USA TODAY (Aug.
24, 2007, 10:12 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/falcons/200708-24-vick-nike_n.htm [https://perma.cc/EU2D-JXZE]. Nike initially suspended
Peterson’s contract after he was indicted for child abuse, but it later terminated his
contract after the NFL indicated that it was reviewing Peterson’s conduct for possible
punishment pursuant to the NFL’s personal conduct policy. Nike terminates contract
with Adrian Peterson, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Nov. 6, 2014), https://www.si.com/nfl
/2014/11/06/adrian-peterson-nike-deal-terminated [https://perma.cc/HSY3-EA7D].
217. Lester, supra note 7, at 32 (“Strict cultural relativists maintain ‘there is no
superior, international, or universal morality, that the moral and ethical rules of all
cultures deserve equal respect.’” (quoting Farnoosh Rezaeeahan Milde, Theories on
Female Genital Mutilation, YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. (forthcoming), http://ssrn
.com/abstract=2250346 (last viewed October 5, 2017)) [https://perma.cc/55VKT8BD].
218. Lester, supra note 7, at 32–33.
219. Mark Fainaru-Wada, Survey shows split on racial opportunity, ESPN (Jan.
11, 2011), http://www.espn.com/espn/otl/news/story?id=6006813 [https://perma.cc
/CRJ5-HX8C].
220. Id.
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athletes more than white athletes, while the white fans suggest there is no
difference in the media's handling of various cases.”221 The critical point
here is that black fans were more likely to perceive the media’s attention
towards black athletes as negative and biased while white fans were of the
opinion that it was neutral and unbiased. Lester postulates that
[s]ome of the frustration reflected in the poll may be grounded in
the fact that there seems to be big cultural differences in how the
conduct of Vick and Peterson is viewed. Some writers have argued
that certain unique aspects of black culture - (dogfighting in the
South, for instance, and strict child rearing mores) help explain
(and potentially even justify) the behaviors of these men, the
inference being that management and the courts should consider
these differences before deciding their fate.222
In evaluating the evidence relating to public opinion, Lester advances
an interesting argument—that the court, in weighing such evidence, should
consider the fact that the morality of certain conduct is measured relative to
the cultural experiences of a particular cultural base.223 Failing to consider
the concept of cultural relativism results in a form of racism. As a result,
courts should value minority mores and culture in deciding morals clause
disputes because this idea
is in line with cultural relativism, which holds that one culture's
practice and morals are equal to another's, even if they are different.
Advocates of multiculturalism, cultural relativism's close cousin,
also believe that “treating members of minority cultural groups as
equals re-quires special accommodations to protect their contexts
of choice.” In the criminal law arena, such an approach is called the
“cultural defense.”224
As Lester accurately points out, the likelihood that a court would accept the
cultural defense in determining the enforceability of a morals clause is low.225
Instead, Lester suggests that a court is more likely to attempt to determine how
the public views the athlete’s conduct by evaluating “media coverage, public
commentary, arrest records, and the views of management (usually in some
combination with these other factors) to assess if public disrepute has occurred

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id.
Lester, supra note 7, at 23.
Id.
Id. at 24.
Id.
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in these forums.”226 The difficulty with this course of action is that this analysis
largely will be influenced by the judge’s own perception of morality, and given
that the majority of corporate decision makers, as well as the purchasing public,
are white, these issues will be resolved to the detriment of athletes who come
from diverse backgrounds.227
Lester’s view about how to remedy the problem presented by discretionary
review of morals clauses is a bit overly optimistic. Although he recognizes that
a bias of some capacity exists regarding racial attitudes towards certain conduct,
part of his suggestion for addressing this problem places the responsibility on
companies to “do the right thing” by equally and fairly enforcing endorsement
contracts.228 Although this is a reasonable assumption, this Article develops
in more detail how this solution is unrealistic because the fundamental
purpose of the corporate entity is profit maximization and because Corporate
America, as well as some sectors of the judiciary, lacks meaningful diversity.
A. Profit Maximization and Wealth Concentration
The same companies that brought the United States to the brink of
financial ruin229—motivated primarily by profit maximization and controlled
largely by a homogenous group of white men—now have the power to
determine morality in a way the government cannot.
The primary purpose of the corporate entity is profit maximization.230
Although the concept of “profit maximization” did not begin with the seminal
case of Dodge v. Ford,231 this case is included in almost every corporate law
textbook and is one of the foundational cases in support of this concept. In
Dodge v. Ford, Henry Ford made two decisions: (1) to cut special dividends
to Ford’s shareholders that included the Dodge Brothers; and (2) to retain cash
in order to build a smelting plant for the purpose of increasing production.232

226. Id.
227. See discussion infra Part V.B.
228. “Companies who enter into endorsement contracts with celebrities should
be equal opportunity enforcers in all such circumstances.” Id. at 51.
229. See TODD J. CLARK & ANDRÉ DOUGLAS POND CUMMINGS, CORPORATE
JUSTICE (2016) (discussing the Financial Market Crisis and how a homogenous
group of white men, investing in risky derivatives, almost single-handedly
destroyed the global economy).
230. See Anthony Nwafor, Shareholders Profit Maximization and Stakeholders
Interests in Corporate Governance, 11 CORPORATE OWNERSHIP & CONTROL 670,
670 (2014).
231. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
232. Id. at 670–71. The court upheld Ford’s decision to build the smelting plant
because it determined that the motivation behind building it related to the business
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Generally, these types of business decisions fall within the province of the
business judgment rule and are unlikely to be challenged successfully.233
When Ford was questioned about why he cut the dividend, however, the basis
of his testimony indicated that he thought the company had made too much
profit and that profits should be invested back into the corporation so to
increase the wages of employees and reduce the price of Ford’s cars to benefit
the general public.234 Based on this testimony, the court declined to protect
Ford’s decision and ordered that the corporation pay a special dividend.235
Ford could have avoided this outcome by testifying that he cut the dividend
to increase cash reserves for the future benefit of corporate expenditures. If
so, the Dodge Brothers likely could not have challenged Ford’s decision
successfully. In oft-quoted language, the court reasoned that
[a] business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be
employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised
in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a
change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to
other purposes.236
Although there is some sentiment that Dodge v. Ford should be
eliminated from the corporate law classroom,237 its fundamental principle
of the corporation and therefore was protected by the business judgment rule. Id.
at 684–85.
233. The business judgment rule provides that a corporate director shall not
incur liability for breaching the duty of care in making corporate decisions as long
as the director’s decision was informed, made in good faith, and in the best
interests of the corporation. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del.
1985).
234. See Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. at 683.
235. Id. at 685.
236. Id. at 684.
237. Professor Lynn Stout argues that Dodge v. Ford precedential value is
overstated for the following reasons: (1) it is an old case; (2) it was decided by a
Michigan court, not a Delaware court that is largely regarded as the most
comprehensive, respected, and influential kind of court in the United States
regarding corporate matters; and (3) the case is more about shareholder oppression
than corporate purpose because the actual holding of the case was that Ford
breached a fiduciary duty to the Dodge Brothers in their capacity as minority
shareholders. Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA.
L. & BUS. REV. 163, 166–68 (2008). In regard to the oppression argument, Ford
really was trying to prevent the Dodge Brothers from developing a competing
enterprise as well as trying to force them to sell back their shares at a cheaper

42

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

about profit maximization continues to be the primary validation for corporate
existence. Therein lies the problem with assuming that corporations will
police themselves adequately in fairly enforcing endorsement contracts. A
corporation’s focus on profit maximization often conflicts with what most
consider “morality.” As economist Milton Friedman remarked, “a corporation’s
responsibility is to make as much money for the stockholders as possible.”238
Because the primary objective of the corporation is to maximize profit,
corporate decision making largely will operate to facilitate that purpose. This
objective ensures that corporations will endeavor to satisfy and align their
corporate perspective with those consumers that best support this end. This
reality is especially troubling considering that the likelihood that black
Americans’ concerns will align with corporate profitability is low given
that the majority of wealth in the United States is concentrated in the hands
of white people.239 Because white Americans possess the majority of
wealth in the United States, white people’s purchasing power operates as
a mechanism for subjugating black people’s issues and concerns for those
of white consumers. Moreover, white American’s purchasing power
forces Corporate America to appease white Americans’ interests. To
appreciate the extent of white people’s purchasing power and influence,
consider that white families own 90% of the United States’ wealth
compared to black families who only hold 2.6%.240 As further context,
black families account only for 2.6% of the United States’ wealth but make
up approximately 13% of the overall population.241 Conversely, white
families make up 90% of the United States’ wealth despite comprising
only approximately 77% of the population.242 In fact, according to an
article from Slate entitled “The Wealth Gap Between Blacks and Whites
is Even More Enormous Than You Think[,]”
the median white family has a net worth of $116,000 dollars. This
indicates 41 million white households across the nation have over
price because the value of the shares would decline as a result of the lack of
dividend. Id.
238. Corporate Social Responsibility: Friedman’s View, BECKER FRIEDMAN
INST., https://bfi.uchicago.edu/news/feature-story/corporate-social-responsibiltyfriedmans-view (last visited May 20, 2017) [https://perma.cc/5QTH-TVFS].
239. Bruenig, supra note 8.
240. See supra note 214 and accompanying text; see also Antonio Moore,
America’s Financial Divide: The Racial Breakdown of U.S. Wealth in Black and
White, HUFF. POST (Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/antonio-moore
/americas-financial-divide_b_7013330.html [https://perma.cc/JGV6-NDFE].
241. QuickFacts United States, U. S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov
/quickfacts/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/DV5P-QYG9].
242. Id.
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$116,000 dollars in net worth. In comparison, nearly 40[%] or 5.6
million African American homes in the U.S. have zero or negative
net worth. In addition, when you deduct the family car as an asset,
the median black family in America only has a net worth of $1,700
dollars.243
These facts highlight that wealth in the United States is concentrated in the
hands of white Americans. Because wealth corresponds to purchasing
power, corporations will be inclined to evaluate morality in a manner that
most closely resembles the United States’ primary customer: white
Americans.
B. Lack of Corporate Diversity
Another issue that largely influences corporate discretion is the fact
that corporate decision makers overwhelmingly are white people. The lack
of diversity in the United States’ corporate boardrooms and among its
corporate officers is well-documented.
In 2016, among the Fortune 100 corporations, white people accounted
for 82.5% of board seats, whereas black people only accounted for 9.9%
of board seats.244 Specifically, there were 1,205 total board seats among
the Fortune 100, of which 994 were filled by white people—773 white
men and 221 white women—compared to only 119 black people—90
black men and 29 black women.245
The board composition for Fortune 500 corporations in 2016 presents
a more disparate result. Specifically, white people accounted for 85.6% of
board seats whereas black people only accounted for 7.9% of board
seats.246 Of the 5,440 total board seats among the Fortune 500, 4,656 were
filled by white people—3,763 white males and 893 white women—

243. Moore, supra note 240 (citing Jordan Weissmann, The Wealth Gap Between
Blacks and Whites Is Even More Enormous (and Shameful) Than You Think, SLATE
MAG. (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2014/12/15/the_black
_white_wealth_gap_it_s_bigger_than_you_even_think.html [https://perma.cc/A92
V-JA7S]).
244. DELOITTE & ALLIANCE FOR BD. DIVERSITY, MISSING PIECES REPORT:
THE 2016 BOARD DIVERSITY CENSUS OF WOMEN AND MINORITIES ON FORTUNE
500 BOARDS 5 fig. 3 (2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/center-forboard-effectiveness/articles/board-diversity-census-missing-pieces.html?id=us:2el:
3dp:adbcenpr16:awa:ccg:020617# [https://perma.cc/3RUH-232A].
245. Id.
246. Id. at 11.
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compared to only 428 black people—306 black men and 122 black
women.247
In considering the relatively low number of black board members, it
is important to keep another unsettling fact in mind: black board members
are substantially more likely than white board members to sit on multiple
boards.248 According to Richard Zweigenhaft, the Dana Professor of
Psychology at Guilford College in Greensboro, North Carolina and author
of several articles about the lack of diversity in the United States’
corporate boardrooms, one in three black board members sit on multiple
boards compared to only one in six white board members doing the
same.249 This statistic suggests that black board members are more likely
to be recycled, which lessens the likelihood that new black board members
will be selected for board positions to enhance diversity further in the
United States’s corporate boardrooms. Thus, the overall statistics about
black people’s representation on corporate boards are skewed because the
minimal diversity that is present consistently is occupied by the same small
number of black people.
The number of black CEOs is even starker. As of January 2016, there
were only five black CEOs among the Fortune 500, and there have been
only 15 black CEOs in the entire history of the Fortune 500.250 According
to Senator Bob Menedez’s 2014 Corporate Diversity Survey, diversity
among corporate executive teams in the Fortune 100 also is lacking.
Specifically, black people accounted for only 4.7% of these positions.251
These statistics clearly highlight a lack of diversity and, more
specifically, a lack of meaningful black representation within the United
States’ corporate leadership. For those persons who are of the opinion that
diversity does not influence corporate “morality” or corporate perspective,
Ben & Jerry’s articulated position regarding the Black Lives Matter
Movement provides proof positive that diversity does influence corporate
247. Id.
248. Richard L. Zweigenhaft, Diversity Among CEOs and Corporate Directors:
Has the Heyday Come and Gone?, WHO RULES AMERICA?, http://www2.ucsc
.edu/whorulesamerica/power/diversity_among_ceos.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/YA3K-SMDH].
249. Id.
250. See Ellen McGirt, Why Race and Culture Matter in the C-Suite, FORTUNE
(Jan. 22, 2016), http://fortune.com/black-executives-men-c-suite/ [https://perma.cc
/SU6B-5DXD].
251. B OB MENENDEZ , UNITED STATES SENATOR FOR N EW J ERSEY , 2014
CORPORATE DIVERSITY SURVEY 11 (June 2015), https://www.menendez.senate.gov
/imo/media/doc/2014%20Corporate%20Diversity%20Survey%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FW4H-KDRY].
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perspective. On the company’s main webpage, under the tab marked
“Values,” it prominently displays the issues that Ben & Jerry’s cares about
as a company. The first item listed is “Racial Justice.” In explaining why
“Racial Justice” is important to Ben & Jerry’s, its explanation reaffirms
one of the fundamental propositions of this Article:
It is true that while we may have fewer overt racists, racism is still
deeply embedded within systems like our schools, workplaces, the
criminal justice system and hospitals, to name a few. Think about
it: because white people occupy a disproportionate number of
positions of power in our society it comes at the expense of people
of color.252
What is even more compelling about the company’s position is that it
supports the Black Lives Matter Movement.253
Black lives matter.
They matter because they are children, brothers, sisters, mothers,
and fathers. They matter because the injustices they face steal
from all of us—white people and people of color alike. They steal
our very humanity. Systemic and institutionalized racism are the
defining civil rights and social justice issues of our time. We’ve
come to understand that to be silent about the violence and threats
to the lives and well-being of Black people is to be complicit in
that violence and those threats.
We ask you to join us in not being complicit.
There is good news: the first step in overcoming systemic racism
and injustice is to simply understand and admit that there is a
problem. It’s trying to understand the perspective of others whose
experiences are different from our own. To not just listen, but to
truly understand those whose struggle for justice is real, and not
yet complete.
Rev. Dr. William J. Barber, II, President of the North Carolina
NAACP, said it best when reacting to the recent police shooting
252. Racial Justice, BEN & JERRY’S, http://www.benjerry.com/values/issueswe-care-about/racial-justice (last visited Oct. 23, 2017) [https://perma.cc/43HV95XU].
253. Black Lives Matter is an ideological and political intervention in a world
in which black people’s lives are systematically and intentionally targeted for
demise. It is an affirmation of black people’s contribution to this society, our
humanity, and our resilience in the face of deadly oppression. See BLACK LIVES
MATTER, http://blacklivesmatter.com/guiding-principles/ (last visited Sept. 15,
2017) [https://perma.cc/7L7P-V4F9].
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in Charlotte, NC. He said, “Our objective is simple: to ensure
justice-loving people act toward justice, with all evidence, and that
we stand together and act from a place of power and love, rather
than out of fear and anger.”
It’s been hard to watch the list of unarmed Black Americans killed
by law enforcement officers grow longer and longer. We
understand that numerous Black Americans and white Americans
have profoundly different experiences and outcomes with law
enforcement and the criminal justice system. That’s why it’s
become clear to us at Ben & Jerry’s that we have a moral
obligation to take a stand now for justice and for Black lives.
We want to be clear: we believe that saying Black lives matter is
not to say that the lives of those who serve in the law enforcement
community don’t. We respect and value the commitment to our
communities that those in law enforcement make, and we respect
the value of every one of their lives.
But we do believe that — whether Black, brown, white, or blue
— our nation and our very way of life is dependent on the
principle of all people being served equal justice under the law.
And it’s clear, the effects of the criminal justice system are not
color blind.
We do not place the blame for this on individual officers. Rather,
we believe it is due to the systemic racism built into the fabric of
our institutions at every level, disadvantaging and discriminating
against people of color in ways that go beyond individual intent to
discriminate. For this reason, we are not pointing fingers at
individuals; we are instead urging us to come together to better our
society and institutions so that we may finally fulfill the founding
promise of this country: to be a country with dignity and justice for
all.
All lives do matter. But all lives will not matter until Black lives
matter.
We ask people to be open to understanding these issues, and not to
reflexively retreat to our current beliefs. Change happens when
people are willing to listen and hear the struggles of their neighbor,
putting aside preconceived notions and truly seeking to understand
and grow. We’ll be working hard on that, and ask you to as well.
- Your friends at Ben & Jerry’s254
254. Why Black Lives Matter, BEN & JERRY’S, http://www.benjerry.com/whatsnew/2016/why-black-lives-matter (last visited Sept. 12, 2017) [https://perma.cc/K
896-VDTF].
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Ben & Jerry’s position on racial justice is an anomaly in the corporate
world. Although many corporations that embrace conceptions of corporate
social responsibility focus on things like environmental issues, Ben & Jerry’s
cut against the grain by focusing on race.255 The company’s racial focus likely
is attributable to the meaningful representation of diversity on its board as well
as the fact that is original founders were socially conscious individuals who
worked to ingrain conceptions of social justice within the organizational
fabric of their business.256 The company’s ten-person board contains four
women—including one black and one Indian female—and one black male.257
Although the board also includes five white males, it has a meaningful
population of minorities, which substantially reduces the tokenism effect.258
Contrast the racially diverse board that Ben & Jerry’s has with AIG’s
board in 2003 prior to the financial crisis.259 In 2003, AIG’s board of 15
members lacked any meaningful diversity. Based on AIG’s Board of
Director’s picture from 2003, its board consisted of 14 white people—12
white males and two white females—and one male of Asian descent.260
Needless to say, this lack of diversity may have been one of the primary
reasons for AIG’s failure. One of the practices that allowed AIG to profit in
the manner that it did during the market boom was its focus on discriminatory
255. Although many corporations provide information about maintaining a
diverse workforce, few corporations are willing to take positions similar to that of
Ben & Jerry’s regarding the “Black Lives Matter” movement. These same
corporations, however, will take strong positions on environmental issues because
there is greater economic benefit in supporting environmental concerns rather than
social justice in race relations. See Steffen Böhm & Annika Skoglund, Why
companies are embracing environmental activism, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/20
15/10/23/world/business-green-activism/index.html (last updated Apr. 14, 2017,
7:41 AM) (“Companies are becoming environmental activists because it makes
good business sense.”) [https://perma.cc/BSV2-C9M8].
256. Board of Directors, BEN & JERRY’S, http://www.benjerry.com/whatsnew/2014/bod (last visited Oct. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/H9W7-H62W].
257. Id.
258. The notion of the “Tokenism Effect” focuses on the idea that minorities who
are not represented in any meaningful capacity have low levels of efficacy in the
decision making process. Mariateresa Torchia, Andrea Calabrò & Morten Huse,
Women Directors on Corporate Boards: From Tokenism to Critical Mass, 102 J. OF
BUS. ETHICS 299, 299–301 (2011).
259. CLARK & CUMMINGS, supra note 229, at 248.
260. AIG, ANNUAL REPORT 2003, at 96–97 illus. 1 (2003). The author and
Professor cummings in their book entitled Corporate Justice highlight the lack of
diversity among many of the corporations that caused the financial crisis and
placed our country on the brink of financial ruin. See CLARK & CUMMINGS, supra
note 229.
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lending practices wherein AIG would charge black borrowers greater broker
fees than white borrowers.261 As a result, the United States Department of
Justice and the United States Attorney General’s Office sued AIG and
successfully negotiated a consent decree within which the company agreed to
1. Refrain from engaging in any act or practice in wholesale home
mortgage lending that discriminates on the basis of race or color;
2. Maintain during the period of the order annual fair lending training;
3. Develop and implement specific, nonracial standards for the
assessment of direct broker fees on residential real estate-related
loans;
4. Post and prominently display in each location where loan
applications are received by the lender a notice of nondiscrimination;
5. Require brokers to make certain disclosures to applicants;
6. Participate in a monitoring program to ensure compliance with the
provisions of the consent decree;
7. Provide a minimum of $1 million to certain organizations to
provide credit counseling, financial literacy, and other related
educational programs to African-American borrowers;
8. Provide employees with equal credit opportunity training; and
9. Pay $6.1 million in damages to those affected by AIG's
discriminatory lending practices.262
In comparing the diversity on Ben & Jerry’s board to that of AIG’s
during the financial crisis, one could extrapolate that greater levels of
diversity lead to more racially, and possibly socially, conscious decisions.
Based on this idea, one reasonably could assume that a more meaningful
representation of black board members on AIG’s board possibly could
have curbed its discriminatory lending practices towards black borrowers.
In fact, some scholars opine that the entire financial crisis could have been
prevented if more women were represented on the boards of the companies
that contributed to the crisis, based on the idea that women tend to be more
risk averse than men.263

261. See Richard Vanderford, AIG To Pay $6.1M Over Anti-Black Lending Bias
Claims, LAW360, https://www.law360.com/articles/153653/aig-to-pay-6-1m-overanti-black-lending-bias-claims (last visited Oct. 4, 2017) [https://perma.cc/9WQ348G2].
262. Consent Order at 10, United States v. AIG Fed. Sav. Bank, No. 10cv178JJF (D. Del. Mar. 19, 2010).
263. See, e.g., Irene van Staveren, The Lehman Sisters hypothesis, 38
CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 1014, 1022–23 (2014).
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Again, if the population consists predominately of white people, the
purchasing power of white people far exceeds the purchasing power of black
people. If the corporate management structure consists overwhelmingly of
white people, then it will be extremely difficult for black people’s conceptions
of morality to prevail when they conflict with that of the dominant group. If
white people and black people view the world from different vantage points
and have different perspectives about morality regarding these types of issues,
then it likely would have been difficult for Mendenhall and other athletes from
diverse backgrounds to validate a different perspective of morality. In addition
to the lack of diversity in the areas highlighted above, there is also a lack of
diversity within the judiciary.
C. Lack of Judicial Diversity
According to statistics from the Federal Judicial Center, white people
overwhelmingly make up the federal judiciary.264
Federal “Sitting Judges” as of April 21, 2017
Total # of
Judges
Total # of “Sitting Judges”
1318
Female
351
Male
967
Total # of White “Sitting Judges”

Total % of
Judges
100%
27%
73%

Female
Male

1047
258
789

79%
20%
60%

Female
Male

148
53
95

11%
4%
7%

Total # of Black “Sitting Judges”

The representation of black judges at the state level is just as abysmal,
especially among judges at the highest state court level.265
Court
Supreme Court
Intermediate
App. Courts
Trial Courts
Total

White
307

State Judges by Race (Numbers)
African
Asian
Hispanic
American
American
20
8
5

Native
American
0

Other

Total

0

340

856

60

25

13

2

2

958

9037
10200

585
665

287
320

104
122

11
13

22
24

10046
11344

264. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/search/advanced
-search (last visited Aug. 18, 2017) [https://perma.cc/7GNL-CWU9].
265. See Diversity of the Bench, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, http://www.judi
cialselection.us/judicial_selection/bench_diversity/index.cfm?state (last visited Sept.
22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/ZQA4-VAYF].
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White
African American
Hispanic
Asian American
Native American
Other
Total

All Judges by Race
State Judges
Federal Judges
10200
652
665
89
320
58
122
6
13
0
24
0
11344
805
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Total
10852
754
378
128
13
24
12149

These statistics highlight that meaningful diversity is absent at each level of
the judiciary. This lack of diversity is critically important because judges
influence the scope and course of the litigation process. Implicit in this lack
of diversity is an inherent bias that can cause a judge’s race to influence
judicial outcomes. In fact, there is substantial research to suggest that
judicial bias profoundly impacts litigation outcomes.266 For example,
research indicates that race influences the likelihood that a judge’s decision
will be overturned,267 the likelihood that a judge will side with a litigant,268
and whether a claimant in a discrimination case will prevail.269 Given the
results of these studies, it is clear that the racial composition of the judiciary
legitimately can influence the outcome of litigation. Similar to the lack of
diversity among corporate decision makers, this problem skews the way that
judges evaluate morality. More specifically, in recognizing that black people
and white people share different perspectives regarding morality, it is not
beyond the realm of possibility that moral differences will influence the way
that certain behavior is perceived. To offset this reality, it is imperative that
266. Rose Hackman, ‘Black judge effect’: study of overturning rates questions
if justice is really blind, GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.theguardian
.com/law/2016/mar/17/black-judge-effect-race-bias-overturning-court-cases
[https://perma.cc/5TEW-L88A].
267. Maya Sen, Is Justice Really Blind? Race and Reversal in US Courts, 44
J. OF LEGAL STUDIES S187 (2015) (“[C]ases decided by African-American lower
court judges are up to 10 percentage points more likely to be overturned than are
cases written by similar white judges.”).
268. Paul Bedard, 8-year study: Black federal judges ‘conditioned’ to go easy
on fellow blacks, WASH. EXAMINER (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.washington
examiner.com/8-year-study-black-federal-judges-conditioned-to-go-easy-onfellow-blacks/article/2540607 [https://perma.cc/34XU-7FW2]. According to a
study from the California State University, Northridge, black judges sided with black
claimants 32.9% of the time, whereas white judges sided with black claimants only
20.6% of the time. Id.
269. See Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: an
Empirical Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117 passim
(2009).
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the way in which morals clauses are interpreted, in relation to certain
expressions, must be modified to minimize this bias.
VI. THE SOLUTION
Because of the concerns highlighted above, courts need to rethink the
way in which they evaluate the enforceability of morals clauses. As the
law presently operates, a plaintiff claiming that a corporation abused its
discretion in terminating an endorsement contract pursuant to a morals
clause would carry the burden of establishing that either the termination
was not made in good faith270 or that the termination violated an
established public policy.271 Instead of using this framework, a fairer and
more balanced approach would place the initial burden on the plaintiffendorser to establish that his speech is protected speech. To establish that
his speech is protected, the plaintiff would need to establish that it falls
into a category of speech that otherwise would be protected if it was
spoken by a governmental employee. This initial burden strikes a fairer
balance because it recognizes the value in prohibiting non-diverse, profitdriven entities from unreasonably trammeling free speech rights,
especially when it relates to marginalized populations that otherwise do
not have a meaningful voice in effectuating change. Moreover, the
relationship between athletes and corporations is analogous to the
relationship between the government and its employees because the
government clearly has an interest in limiting certain employee speech
rights in order to maintain an effective and efficient perception of its
structure and viability, similar to the way that a corporation has a vested
interest in protecting is brand and goodwill. The free speech rights of
government employees more closely approximates the appropriate speech
right protections of athletes in determining the enforceability of morals
clauses because these rights recognize that government employees, like
athletes, should not always have an unfettered right to speak, considering
that there are important interests to be protected by both the government
and private corporations.
Next, if the plaintiff-endorser establishes that his speech is protected,
the burden will shift to the corporation to rebut this presumption by
proving that the plaintiff endorser’s speech is in direct contravention to the
purpose of the endorsement contract, that the plaintiff-endorser’s expression
has a direct and negative effect on the corporation’s goodwill or brand image,

270. See discussion supra Part II.
271. See Mendenhall v. Hanesbrands, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 717, 719 (M.D.N.C.
2012).
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or that the contract includes a clause narrowly tailored to prohibit the very
speech expressed by the plaintiff-endorser.
In thinking about the first type of affirmative defense, in which the speech
is in direct contravention to the purpose of the endorsement contract, consider
a corporation that specializes in selling luxury handbags and other leather
accessories. If that company contracts with an athlete to endorse its products,
it would be inconsistent with the nature of the agreement to allow an athlete
to condemn the slaughter of animals for their pelts or to support the People
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (“PETA”).
In regards to the second category, the morally reprehensible conduct of
Lance Armstrong, a seven-time winner of the Tour de France, and Ray Rice,
a former NFL running back with the Baltimore Ravens, provides two
excellent examples of the type of conduct that could have a direct and negative
effect on the corporation’s goodwill. In Armstrong’s case, Nike, Trek, and
Oakley terminated their endorsement deals with him, pursuant to contractbased morals clauses, after the United States Anti-Doping Agency stripped
him of all of his Tour de France titles and issued a life-time cycling ban after
it determined that Armstrong, along with his fellow team members, used
performance enhancing drugs (“PEDs”).272 Rice also lost several endorsement
deals, including one with Nike, pursuant to a contract-based morals clause
after a video was released showing him brutally beating his wife in a hotel
elevator.273
Finally, the third way that a corporation could establish an affirmative
defense is by proving that the morals clause was tailored narrowly to prohibit
the specific speech expressed by the plaintiff. For example, ABC has adopted
Twitter guidelines prohibiting specific “tweet” practices.274 Although there is
no evidence that any of these guidelines are incorporated into any of the ABC
employee contracts, the guidelines themselves provide an example of
contractual language that could be used by a corporation to allow it specifically
to terminate a contract for narrowly defined conduct. Although this example

272. See William Fothering, Timeline: Lance Armstrong’s journey from deity to
disgrace, GUARDIAN (Mar. 8, 2015, 8:50 PM), https://www.theguardian.com
/sport/2015/mar/09/lance-armstrong-cycling-doping-scandal [https://perma.cc/G9F
M-QDA7].
273. Ryan Wilson, Report: Nike terminates endorsement deal with Ray Rice,
CBS SPORTS (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/report-niketerminates-endorsement-deal-with-ray-rice/ [https://perma.cc/2B8K-UE4N].
274. Andrew Wallenstein & Matthew Belloni, Hey, Showbiz Folks: Check
Your Contract Before Your Next Tweet, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Oct. 15, 2009),
http://reporter.blogs.com/thresq/200/9/10/check-your-contract-before-your-nexttweet.html [https://perma.cc/FM8P-7Q3Q].
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falls outside the scope of the athlete endorsement context, it nonetheless
provides useful illustration of the facts necessary to prove this defense.
Significantly, the test advanced by this Article has some support in
existing case law. The court in Davies v. Grossmont Union High School
District applied a similar burden-shifting framework in determining that a
party could not waive a constitutional right contractually if the waiver
significantly impacted the public at large, even if the party waiving the right
received valid consideration and made the decision knowingly.275 In Davies,
two employees, Dr. Thomas Davies and Ms. Davies, sued their employer,
Grossmont High School District (“the District”), for violations under federal
and state law after Ms. Davies was transferred to less desirable
employment.276 After the suit was filed, the Davies reached a settlement
agreement with the District to settle the case in exchange for cash
consideration.277 The agreement also provided that “‘neither one nor both of
[the Davieses] will ever seek, apply for, or accept future employment,
position, or office with Defendant District in any capacity.’”278 A year later,
however, Dr. Davies campaigned and was elected to the Governing Board of
the District.279 Thereafter, the District brought a motion to enforce the
settlement agreement.280 The district court ruled in the District’s favor and
ordered Dr. Davies to resign from his position.281 On appeal, Dr. Davies
argued that the settlement agreement should not bar his election for the
following reasons: (1) the terms of the settlement agreement did not apply
to the elective office;282 (2) “he did not knowingly intend to waive his
constitutional right to run for office”;283 and (3) the District waived its right

275. Davies v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 1390, 1397–98 (9th
Cir. 1991).
276. Id. at 1392. Dr. Davies was suing for loss of consortium as a result of the
transfer. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 1392–93.
281. Id. at 1393.
282. The court dismissed this argument because it reasoned that the language
of the settlement agreement that provided that Dr. Davies shall “never seek or
accept any office or position with the District in any capacity” was clear.
According to the court, the use of the word “any” was “all-encompassing” and
precluded Dr. Davies from running for office. Id. at 1394.
283. The court dismissed this argument because it reasoned that there was
clear and convincing evidence to suggest that the waiver was voluntary, knowing,
and intelligent because counsel represented Dr. Davies at the time he signed the
waiver, he was highly educated, and the agreement he signed clearly indicated

54

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

to enforce the settlement agreement because it was aware that he was
running for the position but waited until he was elected to assert breach of
the settlement agreement.284 The court dismissed the first two arguments and
did not decide the third because of insufficient factual inquiry.285 Dr. Davies,
however, made one additional argument, and the court of appeals found it
persuasive. Dr. Davies argued that the agreement violated public policy
because it violated his constitutional right to run for elective office and the
constitutional right of the voters to elect him.286 In deciding this issue in Dr.
Davies’s favor, the court applied the Rumery balancing test.287 Pursuant to
this test, the inquiry focuses on whether the public interest in enforcement
of the agreement or provision is outweighed by the policy furthered by nonenforcement of the agreement.288 In applying this test, “when there is a
substantial public interest that would be harmed by enforcement,” the party
seeking enforcement of the agreement must prove some important interest
beyond its own interest in enforcement of the agreement.289 The court
concluded that the District did not meet this burden because the public
policy in favor of non-enforcement of the agreement was more compelling
than the arguments offered by the District in favor of its enforcement.290
The trial court rejected both of the District’s arguments in support of the
agreement’s enforcement.291 First, the District argued that there is a strong
policy in favor of enforcing private settlement agreements.292 Although the
court recognized this argument, it did not find it compelling because this
policy was outweighed by the constitutional right that the agreement
that he had been advised of the consequences of the terms of the agreement and
knowingly entered into it. Id.
284. The court did not address the wavier or estoppel issue because it reasoned
that it needed additional fact-intensive inquiry to make this determination and,
because of the urgency of the motion, the court of appeals did not have adequate
time to remand the issue for additional fact inquiry. Id. at 1395–96.
285. Id. at 1394–95.
286. Id. at 1396.
287. Id. (“In Rumery, an individual charged with criminal tampering with a
witness to a sexual assault prosecution entered into an agreement with the
prosecutor, whereby the criminal charges against him were dropped in return for
his waiver of all rights to bring a civil action against the prosecutor. The Supreme
Court held that such agreements are not per se unenforceable and that the
particular agreement at issue in that case had been knowingly and voluntarily
entered into.”).
288. Id. at 1398.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 1399–1400.
291. Id. at 1398.
292. Id.

2017]

AN INHERENT CONTRADICTION

55

infringed.293 Second, the District argued that the voters were in a better
situation if Dr. Davies were not included in the election because he is a
“troublesome person.”294 The court rejected this argument, reasoning that
“the people are the best judges of their own interests, and that in the long
run it is better to permit them to make their own mistakes than to permit
their ‘rulers’ to make all their decisions for them.”295 Additionally, the court
noted that the right of the people to elect representatives of their own
choosing “is inextricably intertwined with the public's fundamental right to
vote, and may be limited only where necessary to achieve a compelling state
purpose.”296
This case illustrates the central argument advanced by this Article—the
burden of determining the enforceability of a morals clause, attempting to
stifle certain speech, should rest with the corporation.
Moreover, the public concerns highlighted in Davies are more compelling
in cases involving the enforcement of morals clauses, particularly when they
relate to racially diverse athletes speaking on issues related to or important to
members of marginalized populations. Racially diverse athletes have
increased levels of importance to the communities they represent because
these communities often lack the financial and political resources to have a
legitimate voice.297
What corporations likely want is for black athletes to mimic Michael
Jordan’s approach to issues of social justice because Jordan’s approach
maintained the status quo.298 Jordan’s off-the-court personality was focused
293. Id.
294. Id. at 1398. The court found the District’s logic to be “pernicious” because
“the real parties in interest urging enforcement of the settlement agreement are the
current members of the Board, with whose policies Dr. Davies vigorously
disagrees.” Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. See generally Othello Harris, The Role of Sport in the Black Community,
30 SOCIOLOGICAL FOCUS 311 (1997) (examining the role that sports have on the
black community).
298. See Rafael Canton, 'NBA Freedom Fighter' Craig Hodges on Playing with
Michael Jordan and Speaking Truth to Power, VICE SPORTS (Jan. 30, 2017, 8:45
AM), https://sports.vice.com/en_au/article/jp7jag/nba-freedom-fighter-craig-hodgeson-playing-with-michael-jordan-and-speaking-truth-to-power, for the interview with
Craig Hodges wherein he discusses how Michael Jordan refused to engage in political
issues in order to maintain the brands of the corporations he endorsed [https://per
ma.cc/MW6Q-M2Z6].
I think the pressures that he was feeling from corporate entities provided a
lot of his impoliticness. So it was sculpted more to capitalize on the brand,
capitalize on those brands he represented, more so than to capitalize on
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primarily on his brand image to the exclusion of addressing issues pertinent
to the black community.299 Although Jordan represented the apex of sports
success, he
has never shown much interest in shaping the world that lies at his feet.
He carefully dodged any political issue that might have jeopardized his
family-friendly image. When asked in 1992 about the Rodney King
riots in Los Angeles, for instance, Jordan lamely replied: “I need to
know more about it.” He refused to take a side in the tight 1990 North
Carolina Senate race in which Jesse Helms, despised by many blacks,
was challenged by a black man, Harvey Gantt. Approached by Gantt’s
campaign, Jordan declined to get involved, reportedly offering this
explanation: “Republicans buy sneakers, too.”300
Corporations desire that black athletes toe the company line and refrain
from speaking on issues that make white Americans uncomfortable.301 This
concern does not impact white athletes in the same manner because, as noted
above, black people and white people view issues of morality and social
acceptability differently.302 Additionally, because white people disproportionally
what he could do as far as job creation and taking away some of the
violence and the violent mindset. We could've played a larger role in the
images that were given about Chicago during that period of time and years
that followed.
Id.
299. Jordan “has never used his platform to pursue social or political change;
indeed, he’s gone out of his way to play it safe. This is, of course, precisely how the
corporations he endorses want it. Politics and successful marketing don’t mix.”
Michael Crowley, Muhammad Ali Was a Rebel. Michael Jordan Is a Brand Name,
NIEMAN REPS. (Fall 1999), http://niemanreports.org/articles/muhammad-ali-was-arebel-michael-jordan-is-a-brand-name/ [https://perma.cc/S5RL-LY3H].
300. Id.
301. See Michael McCarthy, ‘I Can’t Breathe’: Will sports TV viewers and
sponsors be turned off by activist athletes?, SPORTING NEWS (Dec. 12, 2014),
http://www.sportingnews.com/nba/news/eli-manning-lebron-james-eric-garner-mich
ael-brown-nfl-nba-activist-athletes-new-york-giants-cleveland-cavaliers-georgetown
-hoyas/1iu8uywczsuei1l8vyyjgoi3u5 (“Sponsors get ‘nervous’ when athletes mix
politics and sports, warned Brandon Steiner, CEO of Steiner Sports.”) [https://per
ma.cc/99CX-QLVX].
302. The NBA’s most recent memorandum reminding its players that they
must stand during the National Anthem highlights this issue, especially
considering that black athletes and white athletes have drastically different views
on this issue. Denis Slattery, NBA memo warns teams to stand during national
anthem ‘OR ELSE’, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 30, 2017), http://www.nydaily
news.com/sports/basketball/nba-memo-reminds-teams-stand-national-anthem-
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occupy the corporate management structure, the judiciary, the political power
structure, and contain the majority of the wealth in the United States, their
views are well represented. For example, after several black athletes,
including Lebron James and Derrick Rose, began wearing “I can’t breathe”
t-shirts303 to protest police brutality against black people after Eric Garner was
choked to death by a New York police officer, there was substantial
discussion about whether any professional sports league or corporation would
take an adverse action against the protestors.304 First, for the reasons
highlighted in Part V, it is extremely troubling that a professional sports
league or a corporation could execute a tangible action against an athlete
to attempt to stifle such critical expression. Second, the primary opposition
against the black athletes who supported the protest came from white players,
owners, and fans. For example, Eli Manning, a white quarterback for the New
York Giants, openly questioned whether athletes should use the game
experience to protest violence against black people.305 Specifically, he
remarked that “[o]bviously, when we’re on the field, we’re wearing our
uniforms. You know there’s a time and place to make your statements. I don’t
know if it’s always during a game.”306 Manning’s position reflects his status
as a white male and the privilege that he experiences through the color of his
skin. For him, there exists a time and place to express racial injustice;
however, for the black players that experience racial injustice more directly,
the time, need, and importance of addressing it are more critical. Because
white people do not experience the evils of over-policing to the same extent
as black people, it is obvious why Manning would make such a comment—
he is not affected by it, nor are his family members likely to become victims
of it.307 According to a research study conducted by Cody T. Ross at the
article-1.3532858 [https://perma.cc/BN2M-SL22]. According to a CNN poll, 59%
of white people said that kneeling during the National Anthem is wrong, whereas
82% of black people said that it's the right thing to do. See Agiesta, supra note 7.
303. The shirts represent the words spoken by Mr. Garner as he was choked to
death. See Scott Cacciola, LeBron James, Jay-Z and More Made ‘I Can't Breathe’ TShirts Happen in the N.B.A., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com
/2014/12/10/sports/basketball/i-cant-breathe-tshirts-in-the-nba-how-jayz-lebronjames-and-others-made-them-happen.html [https://perma.cc/632Z-RMM3].
304. See McCarthy, supra note 301; see also Shaun Powell, Reinvigorated
spirit of protest ignites throughout the NBA, NBA (Dec. 11, 2014, 10:01 AM),
http://www.nba.com/2014/news/features/shaun_powell/12/11/nba-shirt-protestsi-cant-breathe/ (discussing whether the NBA’s commissioner might discipline
players for wearing the “I Can’t Breathe” t-shirts) [https://perma.cc/UZ6T-9PN3].
305. McCarthy, supra note 301.
306. Id.
307. Kia Makarechi, What the Data Really Says About Police and Racial Bias,
VANITY FAIR (July 14, 2016, 3:09 PM), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016
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University of California, Davis, there is a “significant bias in the killing of
unarmed black Americans relative to unarmed white Americans, in that the
probability of being black, unarmed, and shot by police is about 3.49 times
the probability of being white, unarmed, and shot by police on average.”308
Jim Brown, NFL legend and social activist, is encouraged by the
willingness of modern athletes like Dwyane Wade, Lebron James, and
Carmelo Anthony to speak out against issues of injustice affecting the black
community. Brown remarked,
I love it. We’ve been asking athletes for a long time, especially this
generation, to stand for something. A lot of them, to me, have been
cowards. And unwilling to do it. Now they are. And I think that’s
great. Even if you disagree with it, let them talk, let them express
themselves. They're not robots.309
When black athletes pull a “Jordan,” their lack of engagement reinforces
the status quo that confirms the majority perspective. The modern-day morals
clause enables corporations to “Jordanize” black athletes by preventing them
from expressing views that are inconsistent with the views of white
Americans. More importantly, these clauses can be used to encourage
athletes, particularly black athletes, to disconnect themselves from their
communities in favor of profit.
The test advanced by this Article does not undermine the scope and
validity of the morals clause. More accurately, it limits the application of these
provisions when they attempt to restrict “protected” speech unreasonably.
This Article’s approach will continue to give corporations the power to
terminate endorsement deals for a wide array of inappropriate conduct,

/07/data-police-racial-bias (referencing 18 separate research studies that provide
evidence that a person’s race influences the nature of his or her police encounter)
[https://perma.cc/N3AE-5QVN].
308. Cody T. Ross, A Multi-Level Bayesian Analysis of Racial Bias in Police
Shootings at the County-Level in the United States, 2011-2014, PLOS ONE (Nov.
5, 2015), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371%2Fjournal.pone
.0141854 [https://perma.cc/HG6M-285P].
309. McCarthy, supra note 301.
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including, but not limited to, hate speech,310 tortious and/or criminal
misconduct,311 infidelity,312 or product criticism.
A critical component of this test requires a determination of the type of
speech that should and should not be protected. Initially, this may seem like a
difficult task; there is a plethora of case law in the First Amendment context,
however, that provides a useful basis for making this determination. Because
of this existing case law, the approach for interpreting morals clauses
articulated in this Article can be applied easily without developing a new legal
analysis or framework.
VII. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Despite First Amendment protections being inapplicable to an
athlete’s right to express himself freely, First Amendment jurisprudence
can be a viable tool to assist courts in determining what types of expression
a corporation may prohibit lawfully without violating public policy or
running afoul of the implied obligation of good faith.313 The position
310. For example, under the approach advanced by this Article, Nike was well
within its contractual rights to cancel Manny Pacquaio’s endorsement deal after he
made the following comments to a Filipino television station: “Have you seen any
animal having male-to-male or female-to-female relations? If you have male-tomale or female-to-female [relationships], then people are worse than animals.”
Cindy Boren, Manny Pacquiao apologizes for saying gay people are ‘worse than
animals’, WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/earlylead/wp/2016/02/16/manny-pacquiao-apologizes-for-saying-gay-people-are-worsethan-animals/?utm_term=.12e213d06eb6 [https://perma.cc/9JF3-E5SX].
311. Although he had yet to be convicted, the test advanced by this article
would validate Cytosport’s termination of Aaron Hernandez’s endorsement deal
after an investigation was launched into his role in Odin Lloyd’s murder. See Josh
Katzowitz, Report: Aaron Hernandez loses endorsement deal, CBS SPORTS (June
21, 2013), https://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/report-aaron-hernandez-losesendorsement-deal/ [https://perma.cc/C2C6-2NGP].
312. Tiger Woods’s infidelity would provide a valid basis to terminate an
endorsement deal. After admitting that he had engaged in infidelity, Woods lost
endorsement deals with AT&T, Accenture, and Gatorade. Interestingly, it is not
entirely clear that these companies terminated him for violating a morals clause or
whether his endorsement contracts were not renewed when the original contract
expired. Gatorade cuts ties with Tiger Woods; third major sponsor to drop him,
N.Y. POST (Feb. 26, 2010), http://nypost.com/2010/02/26/gatorade-cuts-ties-withtiger-woods-third-major-sponsor-to-drop-him/ [https://perma.cc/X2EE-L7ZZ].
313. Because private corporations are not state actors, First Amendment free
speech rights do not attach. See Jeannette Cox, A Chill Around the Water Cooler:
First Amendment in the Workplace, 15 INSIGHTS ON L. & SOC’Y 12 (2015),
https://www.americanbar.org/publications/insights_on_law_andsociety/15/winter
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advanced by this Article is that the implied obligation of good faith and/or
the public policy exception should operate to prohibit a corporation from
terminating an athlete’s contract when the athlete engages in content or
viewpoint-based speech that otherwise would be protected by the First
Amendment. The basis for this position is that athletes play a critical role
in bringing issues of injustice to the forefront of the social conscience.
Although a particular athlete’s position may not coalesce with the
management of the corporation, an athlete’s position nonetheless may
provide useful insight to the public. This notion is particularly true regarding
marginalized populations, such as the black community, in which athletes
have an increased level of importance in light of the lack of traditional
opportunities in these communities. There may be circumstances in which
an athlete’s speech may be deemed morally reprehensible to corporate
decision makers and the public, yet the same speech is viewed positively
among members of the marginalized group. As a result, this Article
advances a novel idea that provides for the protection of specific content and
viewpoint-based speech in the scenario in which it would be protected if
spoken by a governmental employee. To understand adequately what type
of speech should limit a corporation’s right to terminate an athlete’s
contract, it is necessary to provide a brief discussion regarding the contours
of First Amendment speech. The purpose of this Article, however, is not
to provide a robust commentary regarding the First Amendment and free
speech rights; instead, this Article’s objective is merely to highlight how
a court may use the existing First Amendment jurisprudence to determine
what type of speech should be protected.
In analyzing whether speech is protected under the First Amendment,
there are three general classes of speech: (1) speech for which there is no
protection; (2) speech for which there is limited protection; and (3) protected
speech.314 The first class, unprotected speech, includes “obscenity, child
pornography,” or speech that constitutes “‘advocacy of the use of force or of
law violation’” in which “‘such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action.’”315 Each category of speech listed in the first class are types of
speech for which there is no inherent social value. As the Court noted in
Roth v. United States, “All ideas having even the slightest redeeming
-2015/chill-around-the-water-cooler.html (briefly explaining that employees have
very limited rights to express themselves freely in the private workplace) [https:
//perma.cc/7F8D-GLMM].
314. KATHLEEN ANNE RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 95-815, FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND PRESS: EXCEPTIONS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1 (Sept. 8, 2014),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/95-815.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FFE-AFGF].
315. Id. at 5.
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social importance[—]unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas
hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion[—]have the full protection of
the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited
area of more important interests.”316 Additionally, several of the types of
speech listed in this category have another compelling motivation for their
lack of First Amendment protection. In regard to child pornography317 and
fighting words,318 each of these categories of speech causes harm to
another person other than the speaker.
Speech for which there is only limited protection includes
“commercial speech, defamation (libel and slander), speech that may be
harmful to children, speech broadcast on radio and television (as opposed
to speech transmitted via cable or the Internet), and public employees’
speech.”319
The final category of speech, more generally, includes speech that
does not fall into the two prior categories. This type of speech receives the
greatest level of First Amendment protection. Nonetheless, this type of
speech can be limited in regards to its content when the government can

316. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
317. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–64 (1982) (holding that First
Amendment does not protect child pornography for five reasons:
(1) It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State’s interest in
“safeguarding the physical and psychological wellbeing of a minor” is
“compelling.”
(2) The distribution of photographs and films depicting sexual activity
by juveniles is intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children . . . .
(3) Advertising and selling child pornography provides an economic
motive for engaging in an illegal activity.
(4) The literary and/or artistic value of permitting live performances and
photographic reproductions of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct
is de minimis since these things could be accomplished using persons
over the statutory age.
(5) Finally, the evils of child pornography outweigh its expressive
interests.).
318. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). Chaplinsky
was convicted of a New Hampshire statute prohibiting the use of offensive or
annoying words when addressing another person in public after he called a city
marshal a “God Damned racketeer” and “a damned fascist.” Id. at 569. Chaplinsky
appealed the conviction claiming that the statute placed an unreasonable restraint
on free speech. Id. The United States Supreme Court held that the statute did not
place an unreasonable restraint on trade because Chaplinsky’s comments were
likely to provoke the average person to retaliate resulting in a breach of peace. Id.
at 574.
319. RUANE, supra note 314, at 1.

62

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

establish that its regulation is designed to serve a compelling state interest
and that it is drawn narrowly to serve that purpose.320 The government also
can regulate content-neutral speech in regards to its time, place, and
manner if the regulation is tailored narrowly to serve a significant
government interest and leaves open ample alternative channels of
communication.321
In thinking about how First Amendment jurisprudence can assist in
helping to understand what speech a corporation lawfully can regulate,
pursuant to the test advanced herein, consider the Supreme Court’s decisions
in Pickering v. Board of Education322 and Garcetti v. Ceballos.323 Both of
these cases involved circumstances in which a government employer took
adverse action against a government employee after the employee engaged in
speech criticizing the employer.324 These cases provide an excellent parallel
for explaining how First Amendment cases can help in determining the
enforceability of speech prohibited by a morals clause. Free Speech Rights
largely are determined by the status of the speaker and the subject matter of
the speaker’s expression. Private citizens, speaking on matters of public
concern, receive the greatest level of First Amendment protection.325
Government employees, speaking on matters of public concern, also receive
a fairly high level of protection.326 In contrast, government employees
320. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988).
321. Id.
322. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
323. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
324. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564; Ceballos, 547 U.S. at 413–15.
325. Private employers, however, generally are granted more leeway to take
adverse actions against private employees for expressions inconsistent with the
employer’s objectives. According to “Lafe E. Solomon, acting general counsel for
the National Labor Relations Board, however, the National Labor Relations Act
protects some employee social-media activity and as a result, private employees
now have more freedom of speech than their government counterparts.” Douglass
E. Lee, NLRB bolsters private-employee speech, FIRST AMENDMENT CNTR. (Sept.
14, 2011), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/nlrb-bolsters-private-employeespeech [https://perma.cc/LQR9-WQ5B]. The NLRB protects most private sector
employees and allows them to “form or join unions; engage in protected,
concerted activities to address or improve working conditions; or refrain from
engaging in these activities.” What are my rights under the National Labor
Relations Act?, Frequently Asked Questions – NLRB, NLRB, https://www
.nlrb.gov/resources/faq/nlrb#t38n3180 (last visited Sept. 12, 2017) [https://per
ma.cc/78DH-GPWL]; see also Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub.
L. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947). Thus, employees who engage in these activities
via social media are protected by the NLRB and cannot be adversely disciplined.
326. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570–71.
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speaking on employment related matters have the least First Amendment
protection, especially when the employee’s speech interferes with his
ability to perform the job.327 These employees have the least First
Amendment protection because the government, in this context, has a
strong interest in regulating this type of speech because it has the capacity
to interrupt the government’s ability to service its customers—the
public.328 Given that corporations also have a significant interest in
servicing their customers, by analogy, this category of speech provides the
most reasonable basis for determining when an endorser’s speech should
be protected and therefore not subject to termination via a broadly drafted
morals clause.
In Pickering, school teacher Marvin Pickering was terminated after he
wrote a letter to the local newspaper criticizing his employer, the Will
County School Board in Illinois (“Board”) and the superintendent.329
Pickering’s letter criticized: (1) the manner in which the Board handled
two bond issues to raise money for the school district; (2) the way the
school stated that funds from the bond issue would be used for
academic/educational purposes, yet were used disproportionately for
athletic endeavors; and (3) the superintendent and Board for attempting to
prevent teachers from the district from criticizing the Board.330 The United
States Supreme Court held that Pickering’s termination violated his First
Amendment rights.331 The Court reasoned that the statements were general
statements not directed toward anyone with whom Pickering would
interact and therefore there was no real evidence that his statements would
interrupt his daily position.332 As such, because neither the Board nor the
Superintendent served as Pickering’s immediate supervisor, the Court
opined that their workplace relationship was too attenuated to hold that
“personal loyalty and confidence” were necessary for an efficient
workplace interaction.333 In essence, the Court opined that the employee’s
speech was not within the scope of his employment and, as a result, his
speech was more like that of a private citizen.334 Although the Court
concluded that Pickering’s letter contained false accusations about the
Board’s allocation of funds, the Court held that such misstatements were

327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

Id. at 572.
Id.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 575–76.
Id. at 569–70.
Id. at 570.
See id. at 574–75.
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not sufficient to justify his termination.335 Specifically, there was no proof
that Pickering made the statements knowingly or recklessly, and,
therefore, his First Amendment right to freedom of speech trumped the
Board’s desire to terminate.336 Moreover, there was no real evidence that
Pickering’s statements harmed the school district because his statements
were made after the bonds were awarded already and the board’s true
allocation of funds was a matter of public record that clarified that the
funds were not spent improperly as Pickering claimed.337
In Garcetti, Ceballos, a deputy district attorney for the Los Angeles
District Attorney’s Office, sent an inter-office memorandum complaining
about an affidavit that was used to obtain a search warrant.338 Specifically,
a local defense attorney contacted Ceballos and informed him about several
inaccuracies contained in the affidavit.339 Ceballos investigated the assertions
made in the affidavit and determined that it did in fact contain serious
misrepresentations.340 Ceballos then called the warrant affiant, a deputy
sheriff in the local sheriff’s department, to discuss the misrepresentations, but
Ceballos was not happy with the deputy’s response.341 Thereafter, Ceballos
communicated his findings to his supervisors and subsequently drafted a
memorandum reiterating his concerns and recommending dismissal of the
case.342 His supervisors disagreed and thereafter Ceballos alleged that he was
subjected to a series of retaliatory employment actions that included
“reassignment from his calendar deputy position to a trial deputy position,
transfer to another courthouse, and denial of a promotion.”343 Ceballos argued
that these actions directly resulted from the memorandum he drafted and thus

335. Id. at 572–73.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 572.
338. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 410 (2006).
339. Id. at 413.
340. Id. at 414. More specifically,
After examining the affidavit and visiting the location it described, Ceballos
determined the affidavit contained serious misrepresentations. The affidavit
called a long driveway what Ceballos thought should have been referred to
as a separate roadway. Ceballos also questioned the affidavit’s statement that
tire tracks led from a stripped-down truck to the premises covered by the
warrant. His doubts arose from his conclusion that the roadway’s
composition in some places made it difficult or impossible to leave visible
tire tracks.
Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 415.
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amounted to a violation of his First Amendment rights.344 His employer
disagreed and asserted that these actions were based on legitimate,
employment-related concerns.345 In deciding this case, the United States
Supreme Court applied the Pickering Test to determine when a public
employee’s speech is protected.346 Pursuant to this test, a court must make
two inquiries:
The first requires determining whether the employee spoke as a
citizen on a matter of public concern. If the answer is no, the
employee has no First Amendment cause of action based on his or
her employer's reaction to the speech. If the answer is yes, then
the possibility of a First Amendment claim arises. The [Second]
question becomes whether the relevant government entity had an
adequate justification for treating the employee differently from
any other member of the general public. This consideration
reflects the importance of the relationship between the speaker's
expressions and employment. A government entity has broader
discretion to restrict speech when it acts in its role as employer,
but the restrictions it imposes must be directed at speech that has
some potential to affect the entity's operations.347
In applying this standard to the case, the Court held that his speech
was not protected by the First Amendment.348 First, the court reasoned that
it was not dispositive that Ceballos made his statements inside his office
rather than publicly because employees nonetheless may receive First
Amendment protection for workplace expressions.349 In reaching this
particular conclusion, the Court wanted to make clear that expressions
made in the office context do not result automatically in a right to
restrict.350 Second, the Court reasoned that it was not dispositive that the
memorandum concerned the subject matter of Ceballos’s employment.351
The Court was careful to highlight this point because it realized the
employees in a particular workplace setting may be in the best position to
speak about a particular issue because of their knowledge about the
workplace and its operation.352 In reaching its conclusion that Ceballos’s
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 417–19.
Id. at 418.
See id. at 426.
Id. at 421.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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speech was not protected, the Court relied heavily on the fact that his
comments were made in the scope of his workplace duties; in fact,
Ceballos admitted that he prepared the memorandum pursuant to his job
as a prosecutor.353 As such, the Court determined that Ceballos was
speaking as a government employee and not as a general citizen.354 An
employee may speak generally about issues concerning his employment,
but when that speech begins to connect with the employee’s official
workplace responsibilities and capacity, the government will have a
greater right to restrict the employee’s speech.355 As the court noted,
Official communications have official consequences, creating a
need for substantive consistency and clarity. Supervisors must
ensure that their employees’ official communications are accurate,
demonstrate sound judgment, and promote the employer's
mission. Ceballos’ memo is illustrative. It demanded the attention
of his supervisors and led to a heated meeting with employees
from the sheriff's department. If Ceballos’ superiors thought his
memo was inflammatory or misguided, they had the authority to
take proper corrective action.356
These cases thoroughly illustrate that the government must respect the
free speech rights of government employees when the employee’s speech
relates to matters of concern for the general citizenry and is not specifically
within the scope of the employment relationship.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of the test advanced by this Article is not designed to
undermine the contractual relationship between corporations and athleteendorsers. Morals clauses will and should continue to empower corporations
to protect their brand images. Corporations, however, should not possess the
power to use morals clauses to restrict speech unreasonably that otherwise
should be protected. When morals clauses operate to restrict this type of
speech, they harm the athlete-endorser as well as the public. The voice of
the modern athlete is a critical voice in inspiring positive change. As

353. Id.
354. Id. (“We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to
their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from
employer discipline.”).
355. Id.
356. Id. at 422–23.
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evidenced by the historical accounts of Muhammad Ali, Tommie Smith, and
John Carlos, athletes have the power to bring issues of injustice to the
consciousness of the world. Athletes, via their respective athletic platforms
and social acclaim, have the capacity to express their ideas in a way that
resonate with people who might not otherwise be receptive to certain ideas.

